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The Evolving Role of the Director in
Corporate Governance
By MARSHALL L. SMALL*

I.

Developing Trends in Corporate Governance

Corporate governance has, within approximately the past five

years, again become a subject of intense national debate, in Congress,I
the Federal regulatory agencies, 2 the academic community,3 the orga*

Member, California Bar.

1. See, e.g., Hearingson CorporateRights andResponsibilitiesBefore the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Corporate
Rights]; Hearingson the Shareholders'Part/cFlationin CorporateDecision-MakingBefore the
Subcomm. on Citizen and Shareholder Rights and Remedies of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
2. See, e.g., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13482 (Apr. 28, 1977), [19771978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,130 and SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 13901 (Aug. 29, 1977), [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,296 (announcing public hearings to reexamine rules relating to shareholder communication and shareholder participation in the corporate electoral process and corporate governance generally); [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,653 (SEC Staff
Summary of Comments received as a result of the public hearings) [hereinafter cited as SEC
Staff Summary]; SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14970, [1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,645 (announcing proposed amendments to the proxy rules as a
result of the public hearings) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Governance Rules]. After receiving extensive comments, final amendments to the proxy rules relating to corporate governance disclosures were adopted, effective for fiscal years ending on or after December 25,
1978, for initial filings on or after January 15, 1979. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15384 (Dec. 6, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,766
[hereinafter referred to as CorporateGovernance Rules]. The SEC also addressed the question of corporate governance in its REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE
PAYMENTS AND PRAcTICES, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as
SEC QUESTIONABLE PAYMENTS REPORT], submitted to the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs on May 12, 1976. The FTC also announced the establishment
of a Task Force on Corporate Accountability to explore such topics as whether new remedies might be called for to combat certain types of behavior, such as the appointment of
special directors, the current standards for selection and indemnification of directors, and
whether to recommend federal chartering of certain types of corporations. [1977] SEC. REG.
& L. REP. (BNA), No. 422, at A-5.

The SEC in recent years has embarked on a program through enforcement proceedings
to secure decrees in appropriate cases calling for restructuring of boards of directors, creation of audit committees, and taking other actions relating to corporate governance. See,
[1353]
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6
nized bar, 4 public interest groups, 5 and the business community itself.
This debate has not been confined to the United States. 7 It has no

e.g., SEC v. Mattel, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,807
(D.D.C. 1974); SEC v. Citizens & S. Realty Investors, 14 SEC DOCKET 953, [1978 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,396 (D.D.C. 1978).
3. See, e.g., M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION (1976), which is
based on a series of four articles by Professor Eisenberg: Legal Models of Management
Structure in the Modern Corporation,63 CALIF. L. REV. 375 (1975): Megasubsidiaries. 84
HARV. L. REV. 1577 (1971): Access to the Corporate Pro.r) Machinerr, 83 HARV. L. RI:v.
1489 (1970); The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate
Decisionmaking,57 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1969); Cary, Federalismand CorporateLaw, 83 YALE
L.J. 663 (1974); Leech & Mundheim, The Outside Directorof the Publicly Held Corporation.
31 Bus. LAW. 1799 (1976); Weiss & Schwartz, Using Disclosure to Activate the Board of
Directors,41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 63 (1977); Winter, Government and the Corporation

(American Enterprise Inst. Studies in Legal Policy 1978) [hereinafter cited as Winter]. In
1976, 80 professors of law at 62 different law schools signed and filed with the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee a statement expressing their belief that state
corporation statutes "no longer adequately serve to guide and regulate the activity of large
corporations and their managers," and concluding that "there is a particular urgency at this
time for the Congress to consider some form of federal intervention." Hearingson Corporate
Rights, supra note 1, at 343.

4. On June 13-14, 1976, a symposium was held at Airlie House, Warrenton, Va. on
federal and state roles in establishing standards of conduct for corporate management,
under the sponsorship of the Federal Regulation of Securities Committee of the Section of
Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association. The proceedings
of the symposium are reprinted in 31 Bus. LAW. 861 (1976). At its May, 1978, annual meeting, the Council of the American Law Institute authorized the commencement of a project
on corporate governance, following a series of discussion groups held under the sponsorship
of the ALI-ABA in various portions of the country. In January, 1978, the Council of the
Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association approved the publication of a Corporate Director's Guidebook. The Guidebook was initially
published as a work product of the Subcommittee on Functions and Responsibilities of Directors of the Committee on Corporate Laws, 32 Bus. LAW. 5 (1976), and, following extensive comments, was republished in revised form as approved by the Council of that section,
33 Bus. LAW. 1591 (1978) [hereinafter cited as CorporateDirector's Guidebook]. The revised
Guidebook is also available in separate pamphlet form from the ABA.
5. See, e.g, R. NADER, M. GREEN, & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976). Final Report of the Fifty-Fourth American Assembly on Corporate Governance (Arden House 1978). The Center for Law in the Public Interest has secured decrees
containing provisions requiring restructuring of the boards of defendant corporations. Hearings on Corporate Governance, supra note I, at 438.
6. See, e.g., Statement of the Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the
Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation,33 Bus. LAW. 2083 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Business Roundtable Statement].

7. In May, 1978, there was presented to the British Parliament a Labour Government
White Paper on Industrial Democracy, which proposed the adoption of a two-tier board
structure for non-nationalized companies. See WHITE PAPER ON INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY,
CMND. 7231 (1978) [hereinafter cited as INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY]. For recent comments
on the German experience in this respect, see Gruson & Meilicke, The New Co-Determination Law in Germany, 33 Bus. LAW. 571 (1977). See also Vagts, Reforming the "Modern"

Corporation, 80 HARv. L. REV. 23 (1966). For a recent survey of trends in several foreign
countries, see The Board of Directors: Perspectives and Practices in Nine Countries. Conference Board Report No. 728 (1977).
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doubt been intensified by the disclosures of questionable payments
8
made both overseas and in this country by publicly held corporations,
including improper corporate political contributions related to the
Watergate investigations; 9 other well-publicized examples of corporate
wrongdoing affecting the public health or environment;' 0 and by the
recent publicity attendant on availability of perquisites to corporate
management. I I However, public debate over the appropriate response
to these disclosures may simply mask a more fundamental and pervasive concern as to how the individual can secure more effective control
over, and accountability from, the major institutions in American soci2
ety which affect his or her life.'
As a result of this debate it seems clear that the manner in which
large publicly held corporations are being governed is in fact changing.
Whether the alterations are of style or substance, and whether they are
occurring rapidly or with glacial slowness, may be matters of individual
perception, varying from observer to observer and from corporation to
corporation. These changes, some of which are confirmed by statistically observable trends, 13 may be generally grouped into three
8. See SEC QUESTIONABLE PAYMENTS REPORT, supra note 2, at 34-43 (summarizing
the results of public filings by various corporations).
9.

See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES, FINAL RE-

PORT, S. REP. No. 981, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 446 (1974). These disclosures resulted in a series
of SEC consent decrees entered against various corporations, as well as criminal prosecutions. See, e.g., SEC v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., No. 3-75-29 (D. Minn. 1975); SEC v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., No. 75-0308 (D.D.C. 1975); SEC v. Gulf Oil Corp., No. 75-0324
(D.D.C. 1975); SEC v. Northrop Corp., No. 75-0563 (D.D.C. 1975); SEC v. Ashland Oil,
Inc., No. 75-0794 (D.D.C. 1975); SEC v. American Ship Bldg. Co., No. 74-588 (D.D.C.
1974).
10. See, e.g., C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 54-57 (1975) (discussion of problems arising from distribution of MER/29

by Richardson-Merrill) [hereinafter cited as STONE]; Allied Chemical Corporation, Annual
Report (1977) (notes to financial statements describe litigation resulting from production of
kepone).
11. See, e.g., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13872 (Aug. 18, 1977), 12 SEC
DOCKET 1520, 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 23,019 (1977); SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 14445 (Feb. 6, 1978), 14 SEC DOCKET 101, 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
23,019A (1978). The SEC has brought a series of cases challenging abuses in this area and
obtained consent decrees. See, e.g., SEC v. Sharon Steel Corp., 13 SEC DOCKET 178 (1977);
SEC v. Ormand Indus., Inc., 12 SEC DOCKET 415 (1977); SEC v. Potter Instrument Co., 11
SEC DOCKET 1984 (1977).
12. In a recent Gallup Poll, 57% of those questioned approved the adoption of a proposed constitutonal amendment that would require a national vote on any issue if three
percent of all voters in the previous Presidential election signed petitions asking for such a
vote. See San Francisco Chronicle, May 15, 1978, at 10, col. I. The recent adoption in
California of the Proposition 13 initiative, which placed a limitation on property taxes, may
be another manifestation of this concern.
13. The National Industrial Conference Board, Inc. (now the Conference Board) and
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categories.
First, the increased acceptance of the need for nonmanagement
directors. Over the past ten years there has been a marked increase in
the number of industrial corporations whose boards of directors are

composed of a majority of nonmanagement directors, from sixty-three
percent in 1967, to seventy-one percent in 1972, and to eighty-three
percent in 1977.14 This trend, which was already well established in the
case of financial institutions, 15 reflects a growing awareness of the need
for institutionalized objectivity in carrying out the directors' oversight

function.
The desirability of securing objectivity in corporate decisionmaking has long been recognized. Early common-law decisions per-16

mitting avoidance of transactions in which directors were interested
and later statutes attempting to regulate such transactions 7 have
sought to deal with a limited part of the problem by requiring disclosure and approval whenever possible by directors not interested in the
transaction. When independent approval has not been obtained, the
decisions have typically placed a heavier burden on those who have
the American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. ("ASCS"), have, during the past 10

years, conducted three joint surveys of governance practices of large publicly-held corporations, once in 1967, NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Conference Board Study], once in 1972,
THE CONFERENCE BOARD, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES (1973) [hereinafter cited

as 1972 Conference Board Study], and once in 1977,

THE CONFERENCE BOARD, THE BOARD
OF DIRECTORS (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Conference Board Study]. The 1977 Con-

ference Board Study describes the results of these trends. Id. at 9-10. Myles L. Mace, au-

thor of

DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY

(1971), noted some of these trends at the Airlie

House Symposium. See note 4 supra. See also Mace, The ChangingRole of Directorsin the
1970S, 31 Bus. LAW. 1207 (1976). A more recent survey confirming these trends was conducted in Fall, 1978, by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., and the ASCS. See NEW YORK
STOCK EXCHANGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SURVEY OF CORPORATE BOARDS, STRUC-

(Jan. 1969) [hereinafter cited as 1978 NYSE Study].
14. See 1967 Conference Board Study, supra note 13, at 6; 1972 Conference Board
Study, supra note 13, at 2; 1977 Conference Board Study, supra note 13, at 84. The Conference Board's studies treat retired officers as non-management directors. If retired officers
are treated as management directors, then the percentages of industrial corporations whose
boards are composed of a majority of non-management directors would have been 49% in
1972, and 60% in 1977. See also CorporateDirector's Guidebook, supra note 4, Appendix C.
15. See 1967 Conference Board Study, supra note 13, at 17; 1972 Conference Board
Study, supra note 13, at 2; 1977 Conference Board study, supra note 13, at 84.
16. See W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 917,
921 (rev. perm. ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as FLETCHER]. For a review of the case law in
this area, see Marsh, Are DirectorsTrustees? Conflict of Interest and CorporateMorality, 22
Bus. LAW. 35 (1966).
17. See, e.g., ALI-ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 41(1969); CAL. CORP. CODE § 310
(West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1975).
TURE AND COMPOSITION
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taken action in which they have an interest to demonstrate the fairness
of the transaction to the corporation. 8 However, in recent years, the
emphasis has shifted from the need to secure independent judgment in
discrete transactions to the need for institutional change in the corporate structure, designed to enhance the board environment for disinterested decisionmaking on an on-going basis. As a consequence, it would
now seem the exception, rather than the rule, that the need for the presence of nonmanagement directors on the board would have to be urged
through shareholder proposal rather than by management itself.'9 Indeed, the Business Roundtable has recently concluded:
The further question is whether in the general or typical case the
board should be composed of a majority of outsiders. It is our belief
that in most instances-there will be exceptions based on the particular situation of an enterprise-it is desirable that the board be composed of a majority of non-management directors. Both kinds of
directors-outside and management-will be subject to the same legal obligations, and will be familiar with the same public and social
concerns. However, the fact that a majority of directors have no immediate accountability for short-range financial results assures
greater detachment and a better focus on longer-range corporate
interests.
We note the strong tendency of U.S. business corporations to
move toward a board structure
based on a majority of outside direc2°
tors-and we endorse it.
This viewpoint is also reflected in the Corporate Director's Guidebook
prepared by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association,
2
and approved in 1978 in revised form by the Council of the Section. '
The Guidebook is also being recommended by the American Society of
Corporate Secretaries, Inc. to its membership for their consideration,
recognizing that particular circumstances may suggest modification of
the provisions and policies set forth.
Second, the increaseduse of boardcommittees. Increased attention
is currently being given to the use of committees of directors in order to
develop more effective methods of conducting the business of the
board, especially in those areas where nonmanagement directors are
18. See, e.g., Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, 160 A.2d 731 (1960); Puma v. Marriott
Corp., 283 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 1971); cf. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
See also FLETCHER, supra note 16, at § 974.
19. For an interesting historical footnote in this respect, see Monaghan, Annual Stockholders'Meetings, 16 BAYLOR L. REV. 129 (1964), where general counsel for Standard Oil
Co. (New Jersey) noted that this technique was used at Standard's 1964 annual meeting.
20. Business Roundtable Statement, supra note 6, at 2108.
21. CorporateDirector'r Guidebook, supra note 4, at 1624-25.
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expected to contribute to objective decisionmaking. Leading examples
of this development have been the audit and compensation committees
and, more recently, the nominating committee. Although audit committees of nonmanagement directors had been recommended by the
S.E.C. as long ago as 1940,22 the most dramatic increase in the use of
these committees has occurred since the Commission's more recent
pronouncement in 1972.23 The Commission's voluntary disclosure program with respect to "sensitive payments," as described in its 1976 Re24
port to the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee,
has given additional impetus to the use of audit committees of nonmanagement directors. The action of the New York Stock Exchange in
requiring listed companies to have audit committees after June 30,
1978,25 only served to ratify the actions already taken by the overwhelming number of large publicly held corporations. The increase in
the number of industrial corporations with audit committees from
nineteen percent in 1967 to forty-five percent in 1972, and to ninetythree percent in 1977, confirms this trend. 26 The rise in the use of compensation committees (fifty-seven percent in 1967, seventy-two percent
in 1972, and ninety percent in 1977), however, has been less dramatic,
since a substantially larger number of industrial corporations have traditionally employed this type of board committee.2 7 The nominating
committee has been utilized by a smaller number of industrial corporations (almost seven percent in 1972 and twenty-three percent in 1977),
but the recent attention received by this committee has already served
to promote a substantial increase in its usage. 2 8 It can also be expected
22. In re McKesson & Robbins, Inc., SEC Accounting Series Release No. 19 (Dec. 5,
1940), 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,020 (1940).
23. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 123 (March 23, 1972), 5 FED. SEC. L. REP.
72,145 (1972).
(CCH)
24.
25.

SEC QUESTIONABLE PAYMENTS REPORT, supra note 2, at 6-13, 67-68.
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL A-29; 2 NYSE GUIDE (CCH)

2495H (1977).
26. See 1967 Conference Board Study, supra note 13, at 155; 1972 Conference Board
Study, supra note 13, at 50; 1977 Conference Board Study, supra note 13, at 85.
27. See 1967 Conference Board Study, supra note 13, at 157; 1972 Conference Board
Study, supra note 13, at 50; 1977 Conference Board Study, supra note 13, at 85. The functions of a compensation committee are sometimes performed by one or more other committees, such as a stock options committee or pension and retirement benefits committee.
28. See 1972 Conference Board Study, supra note 13, at 51; 1977 Conference Board
Study, supra note 13, at 86. No statistics on nominating committees were aailable in the
1967 Conference Board Study. The 1978 NYSE Study disclosed that 30% of the corporations responding utilized nominating committees. See 1978 NYSE Study, supra note 13, at
4. The sixth annual study of boards of directors by Korn/Ferry International, an executive
search firm, disclosed that 71% of the 143 concerns with annual sales over one billion dollars
included in its survey either have nominating committees with nonmanagement majorities
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that the focus of attention will shift to the specific duties of these three
committees as the emphasis changes from the need for creation of the
committees to the manner in which they should reasonably be expected
29
to operate.
Third, the increasedfocuson due diligence requirementsfor individual directors. Traditionally, the position of directors has been an
anomalous one. Having been vested by statute with broad responsibility for "managing" or, more recently, for "overseeing" management of
the enterprise, 30 and by judicial decisions with a fiduciary role on behalf of the shareholders, 3 1 directors in practice have had limited ability
or plan to create them. Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1979, at 7, col. 1. The CorporateDirectors
Guidebook, supra note 4, strongly recommends the utilization of nominating committees,
and the SEC's proxy rules call for disclosure of the use of nominating committees, and
whether such committee will consider nominees recommended by stockholders, and if so,
the procedure to be followed. Corporate GovernanceRules, supra note 2, amending 2 FED.
24,037, by adding item 6(d)(2) of Schedule 14A. The Business
SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
Roundtable Statement also recommends the establishment of a nominating committee.
Business Roundtable Statement, supra note 6, at 2110. The 1977 Conference Board Study
also noted that most corporations also have an executive committee (87% of manufacturing
and 88% of nonmanufacturing companies) and many have a finance committee (31% of
reporting companies). A lesser number (11% of reporting companies) have a social or public
responsibility committee. 1977 Conference Board Report, supra note 13, at 85, 86.
29. A number of accounting firms have published pamphlets describing the desired

composition and functions of audit committees. See also MAUTZ & NEWMAN,

CORPORATE

(1977). The SEC has occasionally sought to define the functions of audit committees, through decrees obtained in enforcement proceedings. See SEC v. Killearn
Properties, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,256 (N.D. Fla.
1977). The SEC also considered defining such functions through its Proposed Governance
Rules, supranote 2, but in the Corporate Governance Rules as finally adopted provided for
reporting companies to furnish their own descriptions of their audit committee functions.
Corporate GovernanceRules, supra note 2, 81,766, at 81,093-95, amending 2 FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 24,037, by adding item 6(d)(1) of Schedule 14A. See also [1977] SEC. REG. &
L. REP. (BNA), No. 421, at D-2.
30. Many corporation statutes have traditionally referred to directors as having the responsibility to "manage" the corporation. In 1974, § 35 of the Model Business Corporation
Act was amended to provide that all corporate power shall be exercised "by or under authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed under the direction of, a board of directors." Delaware's General Corporation law was similarly amended
in 1974. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (Supp. 1977). Some years previously, Ohio
had amended its statute to delete the requirement that the board of directors "shall manage
and conduct the business of the corporation," OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.63 (Baldwin
1953) (amended 1955), II CORPORATION MANUAL, Ohio 32 (1955), and replaced the statement with the simple clause that all authority of a corporation shall be exercised by its
directors, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (Baldwin 1955) (amended 1963), II CORPORATION MANUAL, Ohio § 32 (1956). For many years, California's Corporations Code has provided that the corporation is to be managed by or under the authority of the board of
directors. See Cal. Stat. 1947, ch. 1038, at 800 (current version at CAL. CORP. CODE § 800
(West 1977)).
31. See FLETCHER, supra note 16, § 838.
AUDIT COMMITTEE
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to fulfill either function. Limited advance notice of matters to be considered at board meetings and restricted access to information even for
purposes of review have in the past often precluded directors from serving as much more than "rubber stamps" of management. A study of
board practices of a number of large, publicly held, U.S. industrial corporations conducted in 1969 by the general counsel of General Electric
Company revealed that only about fifty percent of the twenty-five corporations responding ever sent out advance notice to their directors of
32
the agendas for board meetings.
As a necessary corollary to the growing recognition of the desirability of having nonmanagement directors, however, it has become increasingly apparent in recent years that directors, particularly
nonmanagement directors, will be expected to carry out oversight responsibilities, and take the initiative when it is appropriate to do so.
The SEC has begun to stress in various ways the obligations of the
nonmanagement director to be vigilant and to initiate action when it is
called for, 33 so that further emphasis can be expected on a director's
oversight responsibility. Directors may no longer presume that, because they may not be held responsible for the unauthorized, isolated
antisocial activities of individual corporate employees of which they
are unaware, 34 they may therefore be indifferent as to whether their
corporation has implemented appropriate loss prevention and legal
35
compliance programs.
32.

See General Electric Co., Office of the General Counsel and Secretary, Survey of

Board of Directors Practices and Procedures 6 (Dec. 1969).
33.

See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 14380 (Jan. 16, 1978), [1977-1978 Transfer

Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

81,410 (report of investigation of National Telephone

Co.); [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

80,219 (1975) (report of inves-

tigation of Stirling-Homex Corp.); [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
78,931, at 82,012 (1972) (staff study of Penn. Central Co.). See also [1978] SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA), No. 437, at A-22 (remarks of Harold Williams, SEC Chairman).

In the past under the chairmanship of G. Bradford Cook, the SEC had undertaken to
prepare a position paper on the responsibilities of directors, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,302, but later abandoned the effort as unworkable. Address by
Ray Garrett, Jr., then-SEC Chairman, to the Conference Board, in San Francisco (May 7,
1974).
34. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963).
35. Some courts have in the past imposed upon directors the obligation to be familiar
with the manner in which business was conducted by their corporation. See, e.g., National
Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Payne, 261 Cal. App. 2d 403, 67 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1968); Mercer v.
Dunscomb, 110 Cal. App. 28, 293 P. 836 (1930); Vujacich v. Southern Commercial Co., 21
Cal. App. 439, 132 P. 80 (1913). See also Frontier Milling & Elev. Co. v. Roy White Coop.
Mercantile Co., 138 P. 825 (Idaho 1914); Barnes v. Eastern & W. Lumber Co., 205 Ore. 553,
287 P.2d 929 (1955). The more sensible rule would be not to impute liability to a director
unless the director has received actual notice of improper activity, see Components for Re-
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The developing trends noted above offer a constructive means for
responding to contemporary concerns with respect to corporate ac-

countability. But they also carry with them at least two risks. First, a
confusion of responsibilities may be allowed to develop, thereby placing the director in the untenable position of being required to act as a
representative for the "public interest" as well as a delegate of the
shareholders of the corporation. 36 Second, as such a representative, a
nonmanagement director may become elevated to an unwarranted po-

sition of importance in the corporate governance structure, and called
upon to solve problems beyond his or her competence to solve.
The purpose of this article is to examine the evolving role of the

corporate director in light of the developing trends and risks noted
above, and to consider the extent to which increased responsibilities
search, Inc. v. Isolation Prods., Inc., 241 Cal. App. 2d 726, 50 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1966), or has
participated in the transaction, see Holland v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 151 Colo.
69, 376 P.2d 162 (1962), or was sufficiently active in the business that he should be presumed
aware of the manner in which the business has been conducted, see Taylor v. Alston, 79
N.M. 643, 447 P.2d 523 (Ct. App. 1968). See also United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. HaidingerHayes, Inc., I Cal. 3d 586, 595, 463 P.2d 770, 775, 83 Cal. Rptr. 418, 423 (1970). Whatever
may have been the purport of prior case law, in the light of developing trends it would be
foolhardy of directors not to receive assurances that appropriate loss prevention and legal
compliance programs are in place. The enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 102-103, 91 Stat. 1494, in late 1977, adding § 13(b)(2) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(b)(2)(West Supp. 1978)), may be used to
place upon directors the obligation to see that their corporations have adequate accounting
systems to provide for accurate recordation of transactions and protect the corporation
against loss. The United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Park, 421 U.S.
658 (1975), also points to a higher duty of awareness for senior officials of large companies.
The new proposed federal criminal code provides that a person responsible for supervising
particular activites on behalf of an organization who, by his reckless failure to supervise
adequately those activites, permits or contributes to the commission of an offense by the
organization is criminally liable for the offense, except that if the offense committed by the
organization is a felony the person is liable only for a class A misdemeanor. See S. 1437,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 403(c) (1978). While directors will be entitled to rely upon reports
received with respect to the implementation of necessary programs, see ALI-ABA MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT § 35 (1974), they must at least ask the question periodically as to whether
such programs have been implemented.
36. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 10, at 152-83, where the suggestion is made to put
public directors on the boards of corporations under certain circumstances. This suggestion
was commented upon favorably in Winter, supra note 3, at 57. Conflicts become especially
acute for such directors in areas such as protection of the attorney-client privilege and the
handling of potential contingent claims against the corporation which have not been asserted, each of which will be discussed more fully infra. See notes 50-51 & accompanying
text infra. Furthermore, no matter how carefully selected the board members are, and how
conscientiously they perform board duties, their efforts may come to naught if subordinates
wilfully ignore board directives. For an example of difficulties which a director may encounter in seeking to enforce a legal compliance program, see Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1979, at 1,
col. 6.
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can fairly be placed upon directors in a manner that will maintain a
realistic balance between imposing minimum standards of performance
without detering conscientious individuals from serving as directors.
The article will essentially focus on the direction of the large publicly
held corporation with widely distributed shareholdings. Where one or
special problems may arise
a few shareholders control the enterprise,
37
that must be separately considered.
II.

For Whom Should the Director Act?

At its 1978 Annual Meeting the shareholders of Control Data Corporation, a Delaware corporation, were asked to approve the addition
of two new provisions to the corporation's certificate of incorporation.
One of these provisions (Article Tenth) stated as follows:
TENTH: The Board of Directors of the Corporation, when
evaluating any offer of another party to (a) make a tender or exchange offer for any equity security of the Corporation, (b) merge or
consolidate the Corporation with another corporation, or (c)
purchase or otherwise acquire all or substantially all of the properties
and assets of the Corporation, shall, in connection with the exercise
of its judgment in determing what is in the best interests of the Corporation and its stockholders, give due consideration to all relevant
factors, including without limitation the social and economic effects
on the employees, customers, suppliers and other constituents of the
Corporation and its subsidiaries and on the communities in which
the Corporation and its subsidiaries operate or are located.
The other provision (Article Eleventh) provided for a super-majority
vote of shareholders in the event of a business combination with a ten
percent shareholder unless certain conditions were satisfied. The proxy
statement which proposed these amendments offered the following explanation from management:
The Board is mindful and supportive, as illustrated by its corporate programs, of the growing concept that corporations have a social
37. Under some circumstances, a court may be justified in limiting the rights of voting
shares. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 16, at § 2072; cf. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,

430 U.S. 1, 47 (1977). However, in the usual case there is little justification for limiting the
rights of a substantial shareholder to utilize his shares to control an enterprise so long as he
does not obtain unfair advantage by the use of his power. In such cases the controlling
shareholder may have the burden placed upon him to demonstrate the fairness of a particular transaction. See cases cited note 18 supra. On the other hand, where the controlling
shareholder is not involved in management of the enterprise or does not otherwise deal with
the enterprise in a self-interested transaction, there would seem to be little justification for
treating such shareholder differently than any other shareholder. Unaccountably, the SEC
treats such a shareholder as an interested director when sitting on the board of his enterprise.
See Corporate Governance Rules, supra note 2, amending 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
24,037, by adding Item 6(b)(6) of Schedule 14A.
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responsibility to a wide variety of societal segments which have a
stake in the continued health of a given corporation. Certainly an
important group of stakeholders is the owners of the corporation-its
stockholders. They have a right to expect a reasonable return on
their investment and current, candid information on the health and
future plans of the enterprise. Many other groups hold a stake in the
corporation. Employees not only have a financial tie to the corporation, but in many cases have invested a part of their lives in it. In

addition, vendors and suppliers, customers, and communities are reliant on the corporation and deserve appropriate consideration. It is
in the spirit of social responsibility and justice that Articles Tenth
and Eleventh are proposed.
It is of more than passing interest that at a time when the structure
of corporate governance is the subject of critical examination, an object
of that scrutiny should seek shareholder approval of the proposition
that the corporation serves a broader constituency than its shareholders. The cynical spectator might observe that the proposition was being
put forward in an effort to give incumbent management an additional
basis for legitimizing opposition to unwanted tender offers. The proposition was narrowly approved, but it was apparently opposed by institutional investors who saw it was a potential depressant on the market
price of their shares. 38 Whatever may have been the true motivations
of the sponsors and the opponents of the proposition, the controversy
that it engendered underscores the need to agree upon the constituency
to be served by directors and managers when addressing concerns as to
corporate governance.
This need is increased by contemporary proposals that would
place on corporate boards representatives of different identified constituencies such as employees or consumers, 39 or public interest directors
who would have an obligation to represent and report as appropriate to
the general public. 40 The SEC itself indicated in its proposed rules respecting corporate governance that its staff was addressing the means
by which corporations could best account to shareholders and the
41
public.
The actions of the large publicly held corporation affect various
recognizable groups in our society-shareholders, employees, competitors, consumers, and suppliers. Such actions also have an impact on
less well-defined groups in society, such as those members of the public
38. Wall St. J., May 4, 1978, at 38, col. 2.
39.

See R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION

124-25 (1976).
40. See STONE, supra note 10, at 152-83; Winter, supra note 3, at 57.
41. See Proposed Governance Rules, supra note 2, 1 81,645, at 80,576. Perhaps it can
be assumed that the SEC was referring to the investing public.
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who may be directly affected by the corporation's treatment of environmental concerns, or the public at large, which may be indirectly affected by a corporation's lack of an energy conservation program, an
anti-inflation program, or by the corrosive effect of a corporation's disregard of such laws as those prohibiting bribery of government officials.
The method for assuring that the corporation satisfies its obligations to
each group and the determination as to whether those obligations can
best be satisfied through the mechanism of corporate governance or by
some other means must be separately considered in the light of the
objectives sought to be accomplished. It would, therefore, be useful to
examine separately these objectives as to each of the foregoing groups.
A. Objectives of Shareholders
That private enterprise is the method by which goods and services
are most efficiently supplied in our society is a commonly accepted
tenet. Correlatively, encouragement of private capital formation is essential to the continued viability of the private enterprise system. Concerns have been voiced as to whether existing governmental policies,
particularly in the areas of tax policy 42 and securities regulation, 4 3 are
conducive to private capital formation and investment. There should
be equal public concern that publicly owned corporations, which are
the recipients of capital, be governed in a manner that will encourage
potential investors to contribute capital to these enterprises as needed.
Such governance must be based, in the final analysis, on the successful
efforts of the managers responsible for the operation of the enterprises;
but it also requires that existing and future shareholders be assured that
at a minimum certain areas be subject to oversight by persons who can
supply objective and informed judgment to the decisionmaking
process.
First, competent managers must be employed to operate the enterprise, and programs for advancement and management succession
must be developed to assure enterprise continuity. Senior management
must be fairly compensated at a level that will attract and retain a competent staff, and at the same time not result in unfair advantage being
42.

See, e.g., [1978] SEc.

REG.

& L.

REP.

(BNA), No. 460, at E-1 (transcript of testi-

mony of SEC Chairman Williams before the Senate Finance Comm. on capital gains tax
legislation).
43. See, e.g., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5914 (March 6, 1978), [1978
81,530 (effects of rules and regulations on
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

ability of small businesses to raise capital and impact on small businesses of disclosure requirements). See also [1977] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA), No. 425, at A-10 (remarks by
SEC Chairman Williams).
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taken of the corporation, such as through excessive executive

perquisites.
Second, the enterprise's financial statements, and other public dis-

closure documents, must accurately reflect its financial health and the
success of its operations. Accurate financial statements and other pub-

lic-disclosure documents not only assist in measuring competence of
management vis-a-vis its competition, but give assurance to investors,
warn of potential dangers, and serve as a basis for measuring manage-

ment incentive compensation.
Third, adequate controls must be in place to protect against loss of
assets and assure compliance with law.44 Inquiry is also necessary as to
whether the enterprise is operating in a socially desirable manner, even

if its conduct is not yet legally sanctionable, 45in order to enhance the
likelihood of its long-term economic success.
Fourth, long-range planning must be carried out to anticipate
changes in demand for the enterprise's products, the development and
introduction of new products, the need for additional facilities as well
as the additional funds to supply the same, and to otherwise respond to
potential problems.46 These general objectives can be accomplished
within traditional concepts of corporate governance, namely that corporations are to be managed for the benefit of their shareholders and
that those responsible for management act as stewards for the
shareholders.
B. Objectives of Employees

Even acknowledging the increasing use of automation, a stable
44. Such controls should include not only internal audit functions, asset protection programs through employee secrecy agreements, and patent and insurance programs, but also a
review of investment policies for short-term investments where the corporation has material
amounts of cash to be so invested.
45. Consideration of the social responsibility of corporations is not a new subject but
has been considered extensively in recent years. See, e.g., Blumberg, Reflections on Proposals For CorporateReform Through Change in the Composition ofthe BoardofDirectors,53
B.U.L. REv. 547 (1973); Blumberg, Selected Materials On CorporateSocialResponsibilities,
27 Bus. LAW. 1275 (1972); Ruder, Public ObligationsofPrivate Corporations,114 U. PA. L.
REv. 209 (1965). However, the current focus on evolving directors' responsibilities makes
necessary a reexamination of the question in any discussion of the subject.
46. Potentially more dramatic examples of such long-range concerns could include the
impact of the energy crisis on oil companies, the automobile industry and public utilities,
and the health impact of governmental findings with respect to presence of carcinogens in
consumer products. Less dramatic but more frequently recurring examples would include
the on-going process of evaluating anticipated profitability of existing products and segments of business enterprises and proposed future products in connection with preparation
of corporate budgets.
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and well-motivated work force remains essential to the success of any
business enterprise. In order to achieve this objective, the enterprise
must consider such factors as maintaining a safe working environment,
rational and nondiscriminatory practices in hiring, promotion, and retention, fair compensation, adequately funded retirement benefits, and
the continuity of the enterprise as an employment resource. Obviously,
these factors are also of concern to shareholders in ensuring the success
of the enterprise, but the corporate governance structure that provides
for disinterested oversight in responding to shareholder concerns will
not necessarily meet the needs of employees. Traditionally, the advancement of employee objectives has come from outside the corpora47
tion through governmental regulation and collective bargaining.
Those enterprises that have achieved a stable and well-motivated work
force without the need of governmental sanction or collective bargaining have generally done so without the need for including employee
representation, as such, in the corporate governance structure. While
we have witnessed a recent attempt by employee representatives to use
the corporate governance structure as an indirect means of achieving
their objective, 4 there does not yet appear to be any pressing desire for
employee representatives to serve as part of the corporate governance
structure of domestic corporations. Any attempt to do so would inject
into the oversight structure an element of conflict of interest, contrary
to the objective of avoiding self-interest in the decisionmaking
49

process.

47. Examples of such regulations would include the National Labor Relations Act,
OSHA, ERISA and the Fair Labor Standards Act. For a review of development of the
concept of worker participation in management, see Worker Participation, Conference
Board Report No. 594 (1973).
48. The tactics of the Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union in connection
with its dispute with J.P. Stevens & Co. are an example. See N.Y. Times, March 8, 1978,
§ D (Business), at 1,col. 3; id., March 17, 1978, § D, at 1, col. 4.
49. Even the recent British White Paper on Industrial Democracy recognizes the need
of employee representatives on a supervisory board to act subje, t to the same legal duties
and responsibilities as any other director. See INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, 25,
where it was stated: "All directors on the top board, however appointed, will share the same
legal duties and responsibilities. As under the present law all directors will be required to
act on their own authority and responsibility. Company law prohibits the mandating of a
director to vote in a particular way. The Government believes, as did the Bullock Committee, that there should be no departure from this principle and that there should be no question of employee or shareholder directors being mandated to vote in accordance with the
instructions of those by whom they are appointed. Nevertheless it is essential that they
should keep in touch with the opinion of those they represent. Employee directors in particular should be in close touch with the employees and the trade unions. This will be important if they are to be able to reflect the views of the workforce and to provide an effective
channel of communication to them. It will be for those in each company to devise arrange-
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C. Objectives of Customers and Competitors
Both the purchasers of an enterprise's products or services and
those with whom the enterprise competes are concerned that the products or services being distributed are as represented and, if not affirmatively beneficial, at least not harmful to the recipients. Furthermore,
both customers and competitors are concerned that the enterprise not
engage in anticompetitive practices. These objectives have traditionally been accomplished through corporate response to both the free action of the market place and governmental sanction, rather than
directly through the structure of corporate governance.
While developing trends in corporate governance, as discussed
above, may reinforce governmental regulation in this area, it would not
seem appropriate to modify the operational structure of the corporation
to provide for special consideration of these groups as a part thereof,
not only because of antitrust considerations but also because to do so
would, as in the case of employee representation, insert an undesirable
element of conflict of interest into the governance structure.
D. Objectives of the General Public
Members of the general public may be directly affected by activities of business enterprises, for example, through air or water pollution,
and may be indirectly affected by other activities, such as the setting of
good or bad examples as to resource utilization or the support or destruction of government as a result of bribery of public officials. General public objectives have traditionally been accomplished through
external governmental sanction. While the inclusion of a "public interest" representative in the corporate governance structure may be of superficial attraction to some, such an approach is apt to prove
counterproductive for a number of reasons to be discussed, and may
result in an unacceptable confusion of responsibilities for those upon
whom the burden of governance will ultimately fall.
E. Congruence and Conflict of Objectives
In considering the concerns of shareholders, employees, customers,
competitors, and the public, it must be recognized that while there may
be common objectives in many cases, these groups will frequently
ments which suit the particular circumstances of the company and the information to be
reported." In this respect the recent White Paper appears t be less fuzzy than the earlier
Bullock Committee Report with respect to the duties of directors. See COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY ON INDUSTIRAL DEMOCRACY, REPORT, CMND. 6706, at 83 (1977).
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make inconsistent demands on the enterprise. For example, the claim
of employees for higher wages may conflict with the desire of consumers for lower prices for the corporation's products and of shareholders
for a profitable enterprise. The desire of employees to keep a plant
operating may clash with the public desires to curb environmental pollution, and the shareholders' interest in eliminating a losing operation.
The interests of injured parties and potential investors in the enterprise
in full disclosure may conflict with the interest existing shareholders
have in minimizing losses to the enterprise by not disclosing unasserted
contingent liabilities.50
In resolving these conflicts, it would appear that those responsible
for the decisionmaking must inevitably be guided by the long-term interests of the owners of the enterprise in its economic survival and success. This conclusion does not require, however, that the decisionmakers be insensitive to the interests of the other constituencies the corporation serves. Indeed, in the usual case the long-term interests of the
enterprise will be consistent with the interest of these other constituencies. In those instances where there does appear to be a potential conflict between the long-term interests of the existing shareholder body
and one of these other parties, recognizing that those responsible for
corporate governance are ultimately charged with responsibility to the
shareholders offers a useful frame of reference in the decision-making
5
process. '
It must also be recognized that corporate governance offers only
limited answers to the larger question as to how corporate behavior
should be influenced. Corporations are subject to a multitude of laws
50.

The examples furnished in the preceding discussion are no doubt over-simplified.

In any given case resolution of conflicts may involve weighing a number of factors. For
example, the problem of steel pricing involves not only the profitability of domestic steel
companies but also the interests of their employees, domestic purchasers of steel, the con-

suming public who must pay higher prices for products using steel, relations with foreign
nations and the necessity of encouraging free trade, and the importance to the national interest of maintaining the health of a basic industry necessary for national security. These various concerns become particularly acute in the case of a subsidized industry such as shipping.
51. Two concrete examples of situations where such a frame of reference is required
are (1) the rights and obligations of a corporation with respect to assertion or waiver of the
attorney-client privilege, cf Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977)

(en banc) (right of directors to maintain the confidentiality of an investigative report); Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971) (right
of shareholders in derivative actions); SEC v. Canadian Javelin, Ltd., 451 F. Supp. 594

(D.D.C. 1978) (obligation of an independent compliance counsel appointed to monitor corporation); and (2) the obligations of directors with respect to disclosure of unasserted contingent liabilities, see Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5 (Accounting for

Contingencies), 3 AICPA

PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS

(CCH)

4311 (March 1975).
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that shape their behavior. Furthermore, public-interest issues arise
whose resolution will have no clear material impact on the economic
well-being of the enterprise but will cause shareholder disagreement as
to the position to be taken by the corporation. For example, there may
be disagreement among shareholders as to whether the enterprise
should manufacture a certain product (such as napalm), do business in
a particular area (such as South Africa), or construct a particular type
of facility (such as a nuclear reactor). To what extent should the corporation itself attempt to resolve these conflicts through its corporate governance structure and to what extent should they be resolved by others?
This decision may be shaped by governmental concerns of foreign policy, national defense, energy policy, or some other overriding public
concern. It must be recognized that in many cases there will be a compelling need to establish a process for orderly decisionmaking that may
not include the corporate governance structure as the institution best
able to carry out the process. 52 The answer to this last question may
become more vexing in view of the new-found freedom (and perhaps
obligation) recently given to business enterprises by the United States
Supreme Court to express53 themselves on public issues not directly relevant to their operations.
III. What Responsibilities Can Directors Reasonably be
Expected to Assume?
As the role of the director, and, in particular, the nonmanagement
director, increases in significance, one must consider carefully what
may realistically be expected of a director. In the past it has been suggested that nonmanagement directors be furnished with separate staff
and undertake their own factual investigations to assist them in decision-making. 54 This approach has been followed recently in handling
discrete problems such as the use of audit committees to conduct investigations of "sensitive payments." 55 However, it has not met with approval as a general technique for corporate governance, since it not
only creates unnecessary tensions between management and nonmanagement directors, but is a waste of resources when used to create what
52. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
435 U.S. 519 (1978).
53. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 432 U.S. 904 (1978).
54. See Goldberg, Debate on Outside Directors, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1972, § 3, at 1,
col. 3.
55. This approach has been encouraged by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
See SEC QUESTIONABLE PAYMENTS REPORT, supra note 2, at 67-68.
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is in effect a "shadow" management to verify management actions. 56
The balance has been more realistically struck in favor of allowing
directors to rely, in the usual case, on reports of management and
others, and to require independent verification only in unusual cases
where the facts suggest that it would be appropriate to do so. 57 The
developing case law to date supports this result by placing a lesser duty
of investigation on nonmanagement directors unless they are in possession of facts sufficient to place them on inquiry notice. 58 This distinction between management and nonmanagement directors has also been
recognized fn the proposed Federal Securities Code.59
56. See M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 155 (1976); Address by
Roger M. Blough, New York City Bar Association Meeting (Feb. 7, 1973),printedin45 N.Y.
ST. B.J. 467 (1973) (detailed rebuttal to Arthur Goldberg proposals).
57. See ALI-ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 35 (1974). See also CorporateDirectors
Guidebook, supra note 4. Corporation statutes impose specific responsibilities on directors,
such as the authorization of amendments to the corporate charter and by-laws, the issuance
of equity securities, and approval of corporate combinations and payment of dividends. In
each case, the directors will normally rely on reports of others as a basis for taking action.
58. See Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973); Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853 (D. Del. 1972); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip.
Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). On the other hand, the developing case law with respect to scienter also
makes clear that judges may have differing perceptives as to what notice is sufficient to
permit the conclusion that failure to inquire constitutes recklessness. See Sanders v. John
Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553
F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977); Rolfv. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. 96,275 (2d Cir. 1978). Compare the majority opinion in Lanza v. Drexel
& Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) with the dissenting opinion of Timbers, J., 479 F.2d at
1320-21 (when has one in fact seen "seagulls on the water"). Furthermore, the standard of
diligence to which directors are held may be a stricter standard than recklessness or scienter,
depending upon whether a cause of action is based on § 10(b) or § 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, or § 11 or § 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933. See, e.g.,
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1298 (2d Cir. 1973); Berkman v. Rust Craft
Greeting Cards, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,515 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853 (D. Del. 1972).
59. See ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1704(g) (Proposed Official Draft, 1978), which states:
"[Standardof reasonableness.] In determining what constitutes reasonable investigation or
care and reasonable ground for belief under section 1704(f)(3), the standard of reasonableness is that required of a prudent man under the circumstances in the conduct of his own
affairs. Relevant circumstances include, with respect to a defendant other than the registrant, (1) the type of registrant, (2) the type of defendant, (3) the office held when the defendant is an officer, (4) the presence or absence of another relationship to the registrant when
the defendant is a director or proposed director, (5) reasonable reliance on officers, employees, and other whose duties should have given them knowledge of the particular facts (in the
light of the functions and responsibilities of the particular defendant with respect to the
registrant and the filing), (6) when the defendant is an underwriter, the type of underwriting
arrangement, the role of the particular defendant as an underwriter, and the accessibility to
information with respect to the registrant, and (7) whether, with respect to a fact or docu-
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It would now be appropriate to return to the four broad objectives
of the corporation's shareholders, noted above, to assess what may realistically be expected of a director in responding to those concerns.
A.

Employment and Compensation of Managers and Directors

To expect that directors will be involved in the selection of seniorlevel managers is reasonable. In many corporations directors will first
become acquainted with the identity of senior executives through reports made to the Board. They may also become acquainted with such
managers when approving compensation rates for senior executives,
which will entail some monitoring of performance. These functions
will normally be performed through a board committee, such as a wage
and compensation committee. To the extent that the corporation is operating successfully and vacancies are filled by promotions from within,
the directors will have little occasion to question the recommendations
of management as to how vacancies are to be filled. However, they will
want to be informed as to the experience and qualifications of nominees for management vacancies and they will want to know that there
is a definite program designed to ensure the presence of capable man60
agers at various levels in the organization.
When the chief executive officer's position is to be filled by an appointment from outside the corporation, the directors must take a more
active role in recruitment and selection, such as through a nominating
committee. 6! A nominating committee of directors can also effectively
carry out other important activities including recommending the selection of nonmanagement directors, the appointment of directors to
board committees, and the formulation of policies for retirement of directors. To the extent that the nominating committee is composed of
unaffiliated nonmanagement directors, there will be an opportunity to
promote recognition of board decisions as objectively reached in those
cases where objectivity is particularly essential. 62 The directors should
ment incorporated by reference, the particular defendant had any responsibility for the fact
or document at the time of the filing from which it was incorporated."
60. Some corporations also make plans for disaster contingencies by having tentative
determinations made as to which officers will assume posts of responsibility in the case of
unexpected death or disability of key senior officers.
61. See Corporate Director'sGuidebook, supra note 4.
62. See Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1212 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,47 U.S.L.W. 3221
(1978) (No. 77-1724). The acceptance of board decisions may be particularly useful in determining whether to take action against officers or employees of the corporation based on
alleged misfeasance or nonfeasance. The presence of objective decision making in such circumstances may be determinative as to whether a shareholder derivative action is permitted
to proceed. See Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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also be capable of monitoring the appropriate levels and types of compensation for senior managers through a wage and compensation committee, through periodic consultation with independent management
consulting firms retained by the committee.
The compensation committee is also an appropriate vehicle for establishing policies as to utilization of corporate facilities (such as
planes, hunting lodges or automobiles) for personal purposes and the
necessity, if any, for securing reimbursement for such use. It would
seem desirable for reports on the usage of such facilities to be furnished
to the committee through some audit procedure to ensure that company
facilities are being utilized in an authorized manner.
A particularly sensitive problem is review of the directors' own
compensation. Here again it would appear appropriate to secure the
assistance of an independent management consultant, although it
might be more appropriate to have management select a consultant dif63
ferent from the one employed by the committee for its own purposes.
Indemnification of officers for the expenses of litigation may be
handled in the same manner as compensation, subject to statutory constraints. However, it would appear appropriate (and often statutes require) 64 that such indemnification of directors be subject to shareholder
approval or other independent review unless disinterested directors are
available to afford objective approval.
In summary, directors can and should perform an effective oversight function in the selection and compensation of senior managers, so
long as it is understood that they are not to be held personally responsible for the mistakes of managers they select unless those selected are
obviously unqualified by their past experience for their positions.
B. Accuracy of Financial Statements and Other Public Disclosure
Documents
Directors cannot be expected to verify personally the accuracy of
the details in the corporation's financial statements or other public-disclosure documents. They can be expected, however, to insist that
63. The increased availability of information on levels of directors' compensation
would also be helpful in this respect as a means for measuring fairness of compensation
levels. Under recent SEC revisions in its regulations, disclosure is required as to compensation arrangements for directors. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15380 (Dec. 4,
1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 81,765, at 81,084 (Regulation S-K,
Item 4(c)).
64. See, e.g., ALI-ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 5 (1969); CAL. CORP. CODE § 317
(West Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1975 & 1977 Supp.).
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certain minimum procedures be followed to reduce the risk of inaccurate disclosure documents.
First, directors can and should insist that all published financial
statements be carefully reviewed (preferably with the assistance of the
corporation's independent certified public accountants) prior to publication and that all other public disclosure documents be reviewed and
approved by counsel prior to release. Second, directors should insist on
receiving, at reasonable intervals, copies of the corporation's interim
financial reports. Although directors should not be expected to analyze
such financial statements in detail, they should peruse or arrange for
some committee of directors, such as the audit committee, to peruse
such material for obvious adverse trends for which they should seek
explanation from management.
Finally, directors should insist on the creation and effective operation of an audit committee to perform certain specified functions with
respect to the accuracy of the corporation's financial statements. These
functions, which should be clearly set forth in the committee's operating charter, should include meeting with the corporation's independent
auditors to review their proposed program for the annual audit and
reviewing their audit report, including any problems the accountants
believe have developed during the course of the audit. These reviews
should also cover the independent accounting firm's assessment of the
corporation's accounting personnel and accounting systems (including
any internal audit function) and their cooperation with the independent accountants. Such meetings should as a matter of practice include
regularly scheduled meetings outside the presence of management representatives. The audit committee should also meet separately with
management to review their views as to the quality of service received
from the outside accountants and the cost of their services, so as to be
in a position to recommend their retention or replacement. The nature
of functions to be performed by the audit committee suggests that it
65
should most appropriately be composed of nonmanagement directors.
65. This is the generally shared view. See CorporateDirector'sGuidebook, supranote
4; Business Roundtable Statement, supra note 6; NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY

MANUAL A-29; 2 NYSE GUIDE (CCH) 2495H (1977). This is also the view generally
adopted by the major accounting firms who have issued brochures on the subject of audit
committees, although some firms refer only to a majority of nonmanagement directors. See
Arthur Anderson & Co., The Audit Committee of the Board of Directors 4 (1978); Arthur
Young & Co., Shaping an Effective Audit Committee 11 (1974); The Coopers & Lybrand
Audit Committee Guide 11 (2d ed.); Corporate Audit Committees, Ernst & Ernst 35 (1977);
Audit Committees, Haskins & Sells 13 (1974); Peat Marwick, Mitchell & Co., The
Audit Committee 5 (1977); Price Waterhouse & Co., The Audit Committee, The Board of
Directors and the Independent Accountant 3 (1976); Touche Ross & Co., Corporate Audit
Committees 6 (1970).
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A considerable body of precedent has been developing in recent
years as to the functions an audit committee should perform. 66 It may
be desirable to impose additional responsibilities upon the audit committee from time to time, such as the responsibility to obtain assurance
that adequate internal auditing controls have been provided to satisfy
the requirements of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 67 In recent
years, audit committees have been utilized as vehicles to carry out investigations with respect to corporate misconduct, both as part of voluntary compliance programs and pursuant to SEC enforcement
proceedings. 68 It is important to emphasize in this connection two
points: first, there is no necessary expertise possessed by audit committee members that makes them more able than other directors to carry
out factual investigations, and second, inevitably the audit committee
must rely on others to exhume and evaluate the facts, because it cannot
be expected itself to conduct the personal interviews and review the
documents incident to a careful investigation. In assessing the responsibilities of directors who serve on audit committees, expectations as to
what such a committee can accomplish must be reasonable. One can
expect the committee to have clear, written guidelines pertaining to its
function, and the committee may be expected to act in an objective
manner in carrying out its responsibilities. However, it must be recognized that there are inherent limitations on the effectiveness of the audit committee as a device for avoiding corporate wrongdoing.
C.

Maintenance of Controls Against Loss of Assets and Assurance of
Compliance with Law

Although directors may be unable to verify personally that adequate controls are in place to protect the corporation against loss of
assets or insure compliance with applicable laws, directors do have certain minimal obligations in this area.
First, they must satisfy themselves periodically, through reports
66. See note 29 supra.
67. See note 35 supra. See also notes 70-102 & accompanying text infra, as to maintenance of controls against loss of assets and assurance of compliance with the law. As a result

of the disclosures now required by item 8(f) of Schedule 14A of the SEC's proxy rules, the
Audit Committee should also give some form of advance approval to the rendition of nonaudit services by the independent auditors.
68. See SEC QUESTIONABLE PAYMENTS REPORT, supra note 2, at 67-68. SEC enforcement proceedings often require the establishment or continuance of audit committees. See.
e.g., SEC v. Wits, Inc., [1978] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA), No. 460, at A-9 (W.D. Wash.
1978); SEC v. Killearn Properties, Inc. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 96,256 (N.D. Fla. 1977); SEC v. Mattel, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED
94,807 (D.D.C. 1974); SEC v. Lum's, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer
SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,504 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).

May 1979]

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

from management, that the corporation has in place certain types of
identified programs for asset protection. Such reports should cover the

following. The board should require information on the firm's insurance practices, including both insurance coverage and its relevancy to
the corporation's operations, and the extent to which the corporation
self-insures against risks through deductibles or otherwise. Programs
should be in place for protection of patentable inventions, trade secrets,
copyrights, and trademarks, including employee secrecy covenants and
agreements respecting handling of unsolicited ideas proffered to the
corporation to the extent relevant to the corporation's business. Procedures should be implemented for investment of short-term corporate
69
funds to the extent these are material to the corporation's operations.

Finally, there must be clear policies on disclosing potential conflicts of
interest. In view of the recent passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices

Act, it is now essential that directors also receive assurances that ade70
quate internal accounting and auditing controls have been provided.

Obtaining such assurances annually from the corporation's independent certified public accountants should be a responsibility assigned to

the audit committee. By detailing the foregoing areas of inquiry, it is
not intended to suggest that there are any particular forms of asset pro69. For an example of the problems which may arise from investment in money market
instruments, the litigation spawned by the collapse of the Penn Central R.R. and the resulting defaults on its outstanding commerical paper might be noted. See Alton Box Board Co.
v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 560 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1977), and cases cited at 918 n.l.
70. The directors will of necessity be required to rely upon the advice of others-such
as the corporation's outside auditors-as to whether adequate internal audit controls have
been provided, but at least responsibility should be faced for raising the issue periodically.
The legislative history of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 102-103,
91 Stat. 1494 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)), makes clear that there is not an automatic
requirement imposed on each corporation subject to the Act to develop an internal audit
staff, since consideration must also be given to balancing the need for such a step against the
cost of implementing an internal audit program: "The establishment and maintenance of a
system of internal control and accurate books and records are fundamental responsibilities
of management. The expected benefits to be derived from the conscientious discharge of
these responsibilities are of basic importance to investors and the maintenance of the integrity of our capital market system. The committee recognizes, however, that management
must exercise judgment in determining the steps to be taken, and the cost incurred, in giving
assurance that the objectives expressed will be achieved. Here, standards of reasonableness
must apply. In this regard, the term 'accurately' does not mean exact precision as measured
by some abstract principle. Rather it means that an issuer's records should reflect transactions in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or other applicable criteria. While management should observe every reasonable prudence in satisfying the
objectives called for in new paragraph (2) of section 13(b), the committee recognizes that
management must necessarily estimate and evaluate the cost/benefit relationships of the
steps to be taken in fulfillment of its responsibilities under this paragraph. The accounting
profession will be expected to use their professional judgment in evaluating the systems
maintained by issuers. The size of the business, diversity of operations, degree of centralization of financial and operating management, amount of contact by top management with
day-to-day operations, and numerous other circumstances are factors which management
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tection programs that should be adopted, since the appropriate coverage will vary from corporation to corporation. Rather, the author
suggests that the directors at least periodically consider the matter and,
after review of management's reports, act as reasonable businessmen in
determining whether the reports disclose any material gaps in coverage.
Second, the directors must satisfy themselves periodically through
reports that the corporation has identified those laws applicable to its
operations, and that it has put in place appropriate programs to inform
its employees on an on-going basis as to the existence of such laws and
the need to comply with them. Some assurances should be obtained
that compliance is in fact occurring. Implementation of such a program requires a recognition at both board and management levels that
there must be available adequate legal personnel, either through an inside legal staff or outside law firms. Because of personnel turnovers
and fading memories the educational program must be a continuing
process.
Finally, a commitment is required from both the board and senior
management that deviations from the policy of compliance with the
law will not be tolerated. Such a program will protect the interests of
the shareholders by avoiding governmental and private litigation
against the corporation and consequent depletion of not only the corporate treasury through fines and damage awards, but the corporation's
reputation in the community as well. Such a program also will meet
the criticism that large, widely-held public corporations do not obey the
7
laws governing their operations. 1
Having noted the obligations of the directors to assure themselves
that corporate legal compliance programs are in place, it is also essential to recognize certain problems that will inevitably arise in connection with any such program.
1

Limitations on a Director'sDiscretion when the Loyalty of a Proposed
Course of Conduct is Subject to Dispute

Neither administrative agencies nor legislatures are infallible. The
casebooks are replete with decisions successfully challenging the validity of administrative rules and orders on various grounds. For example, failure to provide prior notice and opportunity for public hearing
72
may in an appropriate case render administrative action nugatory.
must consider in establishing and maintaining an internal accounting controls system." S.
REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprintedin [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4098, 4106.
71. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 10.
72. See, e.g., American Bancorpation, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 509 F.2d 29 (8th Cir.
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State legislative action may be determined to be precluded by federal
preemption or otherwise found to be unconstitutional. 73 Even where a
statute or regulation is determined to be enforceable, its application to
a particular set of facts may be unclear, 74 or changing judicial interpretations of the statute may permit conduct once thought to be
75
proscribed.
The obligation of the director to see that his corporation obeys the
law should not, therefore, preclude him from authorizing a challenge to
a statute or regulation when there is reason to believe it is invalid. Furtherinore, the director is entitled to assert that a course of conduct is
lawful when counsel advises that there is no controlling precedent and
a possibility exists that the proposed course of conduct will be determined not to be legally permissible. However, the occasions when such
a legal challenge is deemed necessary will be infrequent, and before

providing such authorization, the director will wish to weigh carefully
the possible consequences to the corporation and to the Board itself
that may flow from responses by either interested Government agencies, third persons claiming to have been harmed by the course of conduct, or shareholders claiming injury to the corporation by the
authorized action. Before authorizing conduct which may be subject to
legal challenge, the director should obtain satisfactory responses to several areas of inquiry.
a. Basis for Conclusion that Proposed Conduct is Lawful

Counsel may not be able or willing to give an unqualified opinion
1974); Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1972); Texaco, Inc. v. FPC,
412 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1969); St. Francis Memorial Hosp. v. Weinberger, 413 F. Supp. 323
(N.D. Cal. 1976); Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1970); K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 6.01-8 (1976).

73. See, e.g., Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 579 P.2d
476, 146 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1978).
74. For example, in assessing the legality of a contemplated business combination
under § 7 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)), a determination must be made as to
whether the transaction will tend to reduce competition in a relevant line of commerce, thus
requiring an identification of relevant competition and market share. See A. STICKELS,
FEDERAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS § 92 (1972). In determining whether a particular pricing
program is lawful under the Robinson-Patman Act, complex cost justification analysis may
be required. See, e.g., H. SHNIDERMAN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN PERSPECTIVE § 95
(1977). The task of compliance with such a statute may also be complicated by lack of
enthusiasm by the government itself for enforcement of the statute and by actions of more
aggressive competitors. See [1977] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), No. 798 (noting
the critical attitude of the Department of Justice).
75. See, e.g., the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), which overruled United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,
388 U.S. 365 (1967), as to the legality of location restrictions in franchise agreements.
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that the proposed conduct is lawful, but unless there is a reasonable
basis for concluding that the conduct is legally defensible, the conduct
should not be authorized. 76 The director should understand that even
the unqualified advice of counsel that conduct is lawful will not necessarily immunize either the director or the corporation from legal sanctions. The courts have indicated that advice of counsel is but one factor
to be considered in determining whether action was taken in good faith
and with due care.77 Reliance on advice of counsel will not be considered as a defense in any event if specific intent is not a required element
of the criminal offense 7 8 or civil cause of action 9 in question, although
it may be considered in mitigation in a criminal proceeding 80 or as a
81
basis for limiting civil damages.
b.

Consequences to the Public Resulting from the Proposed Conduct

The director should consider the strength of the public policy underlying a proscription on proposed conduct, and the type of harm, if
76. There have been suggestions that before proceeding, the directors should receive an
opinion that the proposed action is more likely than not to be held lawful. See Hawes &
Sherrard, Reliance on Advice of Counsel as a Defense in Corporateand Securities Cases, 62
VA. L. REV. 1, 34 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hawes & Sherrard]. An attorney may understandably be reluctant to quantify his advice in precise mathematical terms so as to be able
to deliver an opinion that the "odds" favor legality of the action. It would appear more
appropriate to require that the attorney be prepared to indicate that there is reasonable basis
for concluding that the proposed action is lawful. This would seem to be an acceptable basis
for proceeding in the tax cases. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Op. No. 314, 688, 691 (1967); Rowen, *hen May a Lawyer Advise a Client
That He May Take a Positionon His Tax Return?, 29 TAX LAW. 237, 239-40, 258 (1976). See
also CALIFORNIA STATE BAR RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, RULE 7-101, which provides that a member of the State Bar shall not advise the violation of any law, rule or ruling
of a tribunal unless he believes in good faith that such law, rule or ruling is invalid, and that
a member of the State Bar may take appropriate steps in good faith to test the validity of any
law, rule or ruling of a tribunal.
77. See Hawes & Sherrard, supra note 76, at 148.
78. See Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425 (1908); United States v. Wood, 446
F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 408 F. Supp. 450, 463 (W.D. Pa.
1975); United States v. Pollmann, 364 F. Supp. 995 (D. Mont. 1973).
79. See Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1974); McGlynn
v. Schultz, 95 N.J. Super. 412, 231 A.2d 386 (1967); Hawes & Sherrard, supra note 76, at 79.
80. See Hawes & Sherrard, supra note 76, at 9 n.20, citing cases permitting reliance on
advice of counsel to be used in mitigation of a criminal contempt charge, but not as an
absolute defense. Where counsel is faced with negotiating a consent decree requiring the
client to act in accordance with law, consideration might be given to inserting a provision
that states that challenging a statute, regulation or order on advice of counsel when there is a
reasonable basis for the challenge will not be deemed to constitute contempt of the decree.
81. See United States v. St. Anthony R.R., 192 U.S. 524 (1904); Gordon v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 285 N.E.2d 849, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 931 (1973); Hawes & Sherrard, supra note 76, at 11.
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any, likely to be caused to others through a challenge to a legal prohibi82
tion on proposed activities.
c. Consequences to the Corporation if the Proposed Conduct is
Determined to be Unlawful
The director should also take into account the type of sanctions
that may be imposed upon the corporation, such as loss of licenses,
fines or judgments for damages. The director must weigh the possible
material effect on the corporation's business of embarking or failing to
embark on the proposed course of conduct. Is there a sufficiently attractive corporate opportunity that, on balance, it is in the best interests
of the shareholders to proceed?
d. Alternatives Available for Establishing Legality of Proposed Conduct
The director should inquire whether there are practical alternatives available to test the legality of a proposed conduct short of actually engaging in the conduct. Particular administrative procedures may
permit advance rulings on the legal consequences of proposed actions.8 3 The corporation might seek declaratory relief as to the legal
consequences of its proposed conduct rather than run the risk of engaging in the conduct and later be unable to sustain its legality.8 4 However, circumstances may not make the latter a feasible alternative, and,
in any event, the directors may not wish to precipitate litigation, especially when they are reasonably comfortable with the propriety of their
position and when the consequences to the corporation will not be dire
if the directors are ultimately proved to be in error.
In summary, directors, without being branded as scofflaws, should
be entitled to exercise their sound business judgment in authorizing a
proposed course of action. In exercising this judgment, the directors
will, of course, have to consider advice of counsel and weigh the poten82. For example, the director will presumably be more cautious in challenging a proscription on distribution of potentially harmful consumer products unless he is satisfied that
the products in question are in fact not harmful to the public. Consider, in this connection,
the recent controversy over banning saccharin.
83. Advance requests for SEC no-action letters on the applicability of federal securities
laws and for Internal Revenue Service rulings on the tax consequences of proposed transactions are two often-used examples of this technique. Of course, the SEC no-action letter will
not protect against claims of third parties and the IRS ruling is not necessarily binding on
the government in subsequent proceedings.
84. This technique was utilized in First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 432 U.S. 904 (1978), in
challenging Massachusetts' limitations on corporate spending for political purposes. However, the courts may not be sympathetic to suits for declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality of legislation where there is no real threat of enforc6ment. See Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497 (1961).
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tial benefits to the corporation resulting from the action against any
potential detriment to the corporation or third parties should the proposed action ultimately be determined by a court to be unlawful.
If the directors in the exercise of their sound business judgment
authorize conduct that is ultimately determined to have been unlawful,
the issue then arises as to the extent the directors may be held
personally liable, either in a direct suit by a governmental entity or
third persons claiming damage, or in a shareholders' derivative suit. A
subsidiary question is the extent to which the directors are entitled to
indemnification should they be held liable.
When the directors personally authorize conduct that is later determined to be unlawful, under existing decisions there is a strong likelihood that they may be held responsible in case of suits by the
Government or third parties unless their reliance on advice of counsel
affords them a defense. 85 On the other hand, the decisions do acknowledge that when directors act in what they honestly and reasonably believe to be the best interests of the corporation, the so-called "business
judgment rule" should protect them from personal liability in a derivative action even though it is ultimately determined that they acted in
violation of law.86 Furthermore, unless there is proof of harm to the
85. See cases cited notes 35, 77-78, 79 supra. See also note 89 infra. Should the directors adopt a policy of consciously avoiding involvement in decisions where advice of counsel
is not a defense, under the developing concepts of directors' responsibilities they run the risk
of being charged with failure to supervise management's actions.
86. See Parish v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 261 Md. 618, 277 A.2d 19
(1971); Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1942),
affd without opinion, 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944). See also Schwartz v.
Romnes, 495 F.2d 844, 848 n.5 (1974). For the business judgment rule to apply, directors
must act in good faith and with a reasonable basis for believing that the action authorized
was in the lawful and legitimate furtherance of the corporation's purposes, and must have
exercised their honest business judgment after due consideration of what they reasonably
believed to be the relevant factors. See FLETCHER, supra note 16, §§ 1039-40. One commentator has noted that in a third party suit it is conceivable that a director can be in violation of a criminal statute in furtherance of corporate activity and yet still be fulfilling his
obligations to the corporation in all good faith. See Note, Indemnication of the Corporate
Officialfor Finesand Expenses Resultingfrom CriminalAntitrustLitigation,50 GEO. L.J. 566,
570 (1962). It has also been recognized that a corporation may pay the fine imposed on a
corporate officer or director who pleaded nolo contendere to settle a criminal antitrust suit,
and such action will be sustained against attack in a sharelder's derivative action. See Koster v. Warren, 297 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1961). The court in the last case cited was careful to
point out that it may well be that public policy would strike down any arrangement whereby
a corporate officer could with immunity from personal liability involve his company in antitrust violations. However, such is not the case where there is at least a reasonable basis for
concluding that a court could construe a complex statutory pattern to uphold a proposed
transaction as lawful. On the other hand, where a violation of law is established, it has also
been held that the business judgment rule will not insulate directors from liability, at least
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corporation recovery against those responsible for authorizing the
transaction will be denied, even where the business judgment rule may
87
not be available as a defense.
Sections 5 and 35 of the Model Business Corporation Act, as
amended in 1974, also afford guidance in considering the question of
the director's liability for violation of law. Section 35 provides that
[a] director shall perform his duties as a director, including his duties
as a member of a committee of the board on which he serves: (1) in
good faith; (2) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best
interests of the corporation; and (3) with the care that an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would use under similar
circumstances.
The comment accompanying the amendment to Section 35 confirms that the standard set forth in the Section reflects the good faith
concept embodied in the "business judgment rule." The comment
notes:
By combining the requirement of good faith with the statement
that a director must act 'with such care as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances,' Section
35 incorporates the familiar concept that, these criteria being satisfied, a director should not be liable for an honest mistake of business
where the violation in question involves an illegal payment or other action in violation of a
strong and clear governmental policy. See Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974). See
also Abrams v. Allen, 297 N.Y. 52, 74 N.E.2d 305 (1947); Roth v. Robertson, 64 Misc. 343,
118 N.Y.S. 351 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
In Parish v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 242 A.2d 512 (1968), on
afppealafter remand,261 Md. 618, 277 A.2d 19 (1971), the Maryland Court of Appeals indicated that the ultimate determination that there has been a violation of law may not, per se,
result in a finding of gross negligence or culpable mismanagement on the part of the directors. The court in its first opinion concluded that if the evidence established that the directors had deliberately purchased a business for a price far in excess of its actual value to
eliminate competition and violate the antitrust laws, it is prima facie an act of gross negligence and culpable mismanagement to proceed with the purchase, where on the basis of an
existing judicial precedent it was apparent that a possible exception from the antitrust laws
was so doubtful that the transaction should not have gone forward without prior Department of Justice clearance. However, in its subsequent opinion, the court of appeals sustained the conclusion of the trial court that the purchase in question did not constitute gross
negligence or culpable mismanagement by the directors where they had good business reasons to acquire the business, had obtained appraisals and advice of counsel, and where the
transaction had returned a profit and the business continued to be a substantial purchaser of
the company's milk following court-ordered divestiture.
87. See Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe, 409 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir. 1969); Borden v. Cohen, 231
N.Y.S.2d 902 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Harris, Derivative Actions Based Upon Alleged Antitrust
Violations, 37 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 337 (1971). See also Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy
Ducks, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1101 & n.98 (1968); Forte, Liabilities of Corporate Officersfor
Violation of Fiduciary Duties Concerning Antitrust Laws, 40 IND. L.J. 313 (1965); Note,
Pleading and Proof of Damages in Stockholders' Derivative Actions Based on Antitrust
Convictions, 64 COLUM. L. Rav. 174 (1964).
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judgment. A director attempting to create profits for his corporation
will frequently make decisions involving risk for the enterprise. No
personal liability should be imposed upon him in the event his good
faith decision, in the exercise of business judgment, later seems to
have been erroneous.
This Section also provides that a director is entitled to rely on any
information, opinion, report, or statement prepared by a lawyer as to a
matter that the director believes to be within the lawyer's professional
competence. This provision reflects the general principle that- the
standards of good faith and due care may be satisfied where the director selects counsel he believes to be competent, discloses to counsel all
facts which he believes to be relevant, receives advice on matters of law
when such advice is not so obviously erroneous as to make reliance on
it unreasonable, and acts in accordance with such advice after it has
88
been rendered.
Section 5 of the Model Business Corporation Act permits
indemnification of directors in proceedings brought by third parties,
including payment of fines, if the director is determined to have acted
in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not
opposed to the best interests of the corporation. This rule applies as
well to any criminal proceeding, so long as the director had no reasonable cause to believe his or her conduct was unlawful. The termination
of a proceeding by an adverse judgment, conviction, or plea of nolo
contendere does not of itself create a presumption that the director's
conduct does not meet the requisite standards for indemnification. In
the case of derivative actions brought in the name of the corporation,
indemnification is permitted as to expenses incurred, but not costs of
settlement, if the director acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the
corporation, but denies indemnification when a director is adjudged
liable for negligence or misconduct in performing his or her duty to the
corporation, unless a court specifically determines otherwise.
The comment to Section 35 of the Act, as amended, indicates that
it was the intention of the draftsmen to parallel the business judgment
standards applicable under Section 35 to the entitlement to indemnification under the provisions of the Model Act to the extent possible. A
number of states have enacted provisions comparable to Sections 5 and
35 (as amended) of the Model Business Corporation Act, and it would
88. See generall, Hawes & Sherrard, supra note 76. Section 35 does not indicate the
type of opinion a director must receive in order to be entitled to rely. As noted above, the
better view should permit reliance so long as counsel indicated that there is a reasonable
basis for concluding the proposed course of action is lawful. See note 76 supra.
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appear likely that these provisions will afford protection to directors
who act reasonably in reliance upon advice of counsel when authoriz89
ing corporate action.
2. Limitations on a Director'sDiscretion in Responding to Evidence of
Corporate Wrongdoing
One of the most difficult tasks the directors must face is the development of an effective program for discovering corporate wrongdoing
and preventing its reoccurrence. In carrying out this task the directors
will be faced with problems similar to those faced by any law enforcement agency, including the difficulty of securing reliable evidence of
wrongdoing, the need to protect the rights of potential accused, and the
need to apply an appropriate but not overly harsh sanction to encourage disclosure while discouraging future misconduct. The directors will also carry certain additional burdens that a law enforcement
agency need not carry. They must seek to encourage wrongdoers to
step forward without the ability to afford effective immunity from potential criminal sanction and with the prospect that the information disclosed may under certain circumstances be required to be publicly
reported. How should the directors proceed most effectively under
these circumstances? There are no easy answers, but a few observations may be offered.
In sorting through the multitude of problems presented, the directors' obligation is to act in the long-term interests of the shareholders,
and as neither protectors of corporate employees, nor as representatives
of the public or of individuals who have been the immediate victims of
employee wrongdoing. The long-term interests of the shareholders
may under appropriate circumstances warrant offering some redress to
victims of corporate wrongdoing in order to preserve the reputation of
the corporation and mitigate possible governmental sanction. However, this does not mean that the role of directors should be muddied in
this setting by imposing upon them obligations of public disclosure in89. An analysis of states which have enacted statutes similar to § 5 and the revised
version of § 35 is contained in I MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION AcT ANNOTATED 87, 253
(Supp. 1977). Section 35 of the Model Business Corporation Act, as amended in 1974, states
that a person who performs his duties as contemplated in that section "shall have no liability
by reason of being or having been a director of the corporation." Neither § 35 nor the
explanatory comment accompanying its amendment limits this language to liability to
shareholders in derivative actions, and it is strongly arguable that reliance upon advice of
counsel will also protect the director in suits brought by a governmental entity or other third
party. However, it must be recognized that § 35 is not operative in case of suits based upon
violations of federal law, and may not be conclusive protection even in states where it has
been adopted if the violation of law complained of does not permit reliance upon advice of
counsel as a defense.
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consistent with their duties to the shareholders. 90
The handling of information concerning corporate misconduct is a
difficult task at best, since there will tend to be support, at least initially,
for a manager who has performed well and in whom trust has been
reposed by the institution. In addition, the accuracy and motives of the
informant may be suspect for any number of reasons, including incomplete information, hearsay, reasonable disagreement over conclusions,
concern over the informant's own job performance, desire for advancement, or personal antagonism with fellow employees.
A further complication is that any potential informer may be reluctant to supply information even if his motives are pure. There may
be feelings of loyalty to one's superior and friends, or concern for individual or corporate retaliation. 9 1 A person must have strong convictions to initiate the process of disclosure and, whether or not successful,
thereby risk the loss of position and accumulated benefits. 92 These
problems are not peculiar to business corporations, 93 and no institution
90. The knowledge that directors must, in every case, publicly disclose evidence of
wrongdoing may serve effectively to discourage employees from stepping forward and disclosing their misconduct. Such an obligation placed on directors may also raise problems
under insurance policies requiring the insured to cooperate with the insurer in conducting its
defense. The government itself has recognized that with its limited resources more effective
compliance with law may be obtained through encouragement of voluntary programs. See,
for example, the SEC program on voluntary disclosure of sensitive payments described in
the SEC QUESTIONABLE PAYMENTS REPORT, supra note 2, and the position taken by the
Watergate special prosecutor in encouraging corporations to come forward and disclose illegal political contributions. Where those who are requested to cooperate and voluntarily
come forward with disclosures face the prospect of certain public disclosure of their conduct
and the possibility of adverse action by other agencies, there may well be less desire to make
voluntary disclosures, thus perhaps frustrating any voluntary compliance program.
91. For a description of antagonisms that can develop within a business organization
which preclude senior management from learning of problems on an operating level, see the
examples cited in STONE, supra note 10, at 43-44. One unintended side effect of any requirement that a director act as a representative of the public may be to heighten this sort of
attitude and frustrate compliance programs.
92. One unintended side benefit of the requirements for vesting of pension benefits
imposed by ERISA may be to encourage employees to be more forthcoming in disclosing
misconduct by their superiors in the organization. Some employees who have lost their
positions as a result of disclosures have filed suit for damages against the corporation. See,
e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1978, § D, at 1, col. 1. It is not yet clear whether evolving case law
will grant protection to employees on some tort theory where they have no contractual right
to continued employment upon which to rely. Compare McElroy v. Wilson, 143 Ga. App.
893, 240 S.E.2d 155 (1977) with Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, 145 Ga. App. 438, 244 S.E.2d
26 (1978), rev'd, 250 S.E.2d. 442 (Ga. 1978).
93. A graphic illustration of the fact that governmental institutions are not immune
from problems associated with employee "whistle-blowing" is the case of A. Ernest Fitzgerald and the actions taken against him by the Department of Defense as a result of his disclosures with respect to cost overruns on a government contract. See Hearings before the

May 1979]

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

handles them with ease. However, directors should consider establishing and publicizing institutionalized procedures through which employees with knowledge of wrongdoing may make such information
known in a manner that will permit objective evaluation of the information. Care should be taken to avoid creating a totalitarian atmosphere by charging a separate group within the corporation with this
responsibility. It would seem far preferable that some group that has
other functions as well, such as the internal audit staff, be available to
receive such information. Whoever receives the information should, of
course, have a separate channel of communication to senior levels of
the corporation. Procedures should be developed under which the internal audit staff does report to a senior officer with direct access to an
94
audit committee of outside directors.
Any compliance program must utilize professional legal services at
some point to evaluate the legal consequences of information disclosed.
In addition, attorneys should be involved from the outset in developing
information through interviews of witnesses and review of documents
since their training in cross-examination and evaluation of information
will be essential to any thorough investigation. There will be the inevitable risk of confusion as to whom the attorney is representing while
interrogating employees, particularly if the attorney is one with whom
the employee in question has regularly worked in the past (and perhaps
advised on some personal matters). There may be a need to warn an
employee of his rights and the consequences flowing from disclosure,
with the resultant risk of discouraging disclosure because even when
the corporation may not intend to discipline employees, law enforceSubcomm. on Economy in Government of the JointEconomic Comm. on the DismissalofA.
Ernest Fitzgeraldby the Dept of Defense, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969); Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1972). For a period of 10 years following Mr. Fitzgerald's
termination, the federal government did not provide a satisfactory resolution to the
problems of protecting whistle-blowing federal government employees. See, e.g., Hearings
before the Subcomnra on Administrative Practiceand Procedure on S. 1210, 94th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1975). S. 1210, the Federal Employees Disclosure Act of 1975, which was never enacted. The recent enactment of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454,
§§ 101, 201-206, 301-304, 401-415, 501-503, 601-603, 701, 801-805, 92 Stat. 1111, has at last
provided certain protection for an employee who lawfully discloses information the employee reasonably believes evidences a violation of any law, rule or regulation, or mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger
to public health or safety. Id. § 202 (to be codified as 5 U.S.C. § 1206); Goodman, Vast
Revision of FederalSystem Sets Up 3 ImportantAgencies, National Law Journal, Nov. 6,
1978, at 30-31.
94. See [1978] SEc. REG. & L. REP., No. 485, at D-3 (statement of SEC Chairman
Williams with respect to developing internal audit guidelines).
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ment agencies may later seek sanctions.95
The problems become particularly acute when the party in question is a member of senior management and the board of directors.
The directors should seek to establish as part of any compliance program a committee of nonmanagement directors to handle such situations when and if they arise. As a preliminary, careful consideration
should be given as to who will conduct the investigation, and whether
the individuals concerned should have separate counsel.
In any event, it must be settled from the beginning that the attorney who is conducting the investigation is acting on behalf of the corporation, and that any report furnished to the supervising board
committee to assist in determining how the corporation can best effectuate compliance with the law is intended to be a provileged attorneyclient communication. While any facts developed by the attorney will
of course be subject to discovery as not falling within the scope of the
privilege, the better view is, as illustrated by the reasoning employed by
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Diversified Industries,
95. See, in this connection, United States v. Handler, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 96,519 (C.D. Cal. 1978), where the report of Special Counsel appointed by
a corporation pursuant to an SEC consent decree ultimately led to criminal prosecutions.
Under some decisions, the corporation may be held criminally responsible for acts of its
employees even in violation of corporate policy, and therefore have a common objective
with the employee in avoiding prosecution. See United States v. Hilton Hotel Corp., 417
F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); United States v. American
Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
948 (1971); U.S. v. Armour & Co., 168 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1948). Where an investigation is not
conducted under the requirements of a consent decree providing for public filing of a report,
there may be a basis for disclosures to an attorney to be protected under a theory of "joint
defense." See Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1965); Continental Oil Co.
v. United States, 330 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1964); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 406 F. Supp. 381
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Multile Party Situations,8 COLUM.
J.L. Soc. PROB. 179 (1972); Note, Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege on Inter-Attorney Exchange of Information, 63 YALE L.J. 1029 (1954); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 91, at 189
(2d ed. 1972); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2312, at 603 (McNaughton rev. 1961). However,
it must be clear that the attorney is in fact acting as counsel for the employee being interrogated and not simply as counsel for the corporation. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 434
F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Mich. 1977); State of Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 50
F.R.D. 37 (N.D. Ill. 1969), rev'd in part sub nom. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker,
423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), a]J'dby equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971). Those
conducting the investigation will wish to consider carefully the necessity of warning a potential object of the investigation of possible criminal prosecution should the information disclosed by the investigation ultimately be made public. On the other hand, such warnings
may serve to chill the willingness of employees to cooperate and frustrate the purpose of the
investigation in circumstances where the corporation has no power to grant immunity and
no intention of proceeding in a punitive fashion against the employees in question.
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Inc. v. Meredith,96 that the report itself is a privileged communication.
This view will better serve the public by making board committees free
to undertake vigorous compliance programs and receive reports from
counsel on their effectiveness, without fear of generating reports subject
to discovery in adversary proceedings.
One final development should be noted. There has been an increasing tendency of late for the Enforcement Division of the SEC to
require the appointment of special counsel to conduct or review investigations carried out by board committees in settlement of enforcement
procedures. At least two potential problems emerge from this procedure. First, confusion may develop as to whether the counsel is to be
viewed as acting for the committee and subject to the attorney-client
privilege. 97 Second, a report will normally be required to be publicly
filed, which may result in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
There are no clear or easy answers to these problems, and the most that
can be said is that any such settlement should carefully define the special counsel's role as counsel to the board committee, seek to preserve
the attorney-client privilege to the extent possible, and limit any obligation to file a public report to one containing only material information
necessary for the protection of investors.
Once an investigation has been completed, the directors, acting as
a board or through a board committee, must consider the question of
discipline of those involved in any misconduct. As with any court, the
board or committee must weigh many factors, including any personal
benefit derived by the employee from his actions, the gravity of the
offense, the harm suffered by the corporation, the value of the employee to the corporation, the ability of the individual to make restitution, and the necessity of imposing discipline to deter future
misconduct. The board or committee should have broad discretion, in
the exercise of sound business judgment, to determine whether to censure, demote or terminate the employee, or demand restitution. So
long as there is a reasonable basis for this decision and it is not the
result of personal interest, courts should refrain from second-guessing.9 8 Institutionalized objectivity in corporate decision-making will
96. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc). But see In re Grand Jury Subpoena, FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,804 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
97. See SEC v. Canadian Javelin, Ltd., 451 F. Supp. 594 (D.D.C. 1978).
98. A number of decisions reflect the inclination of courts to accord such deference to
the business judgment of disinterested directors. See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881); Ash v.
IBM, 353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966); Stadin v. Union Elec.
Co., 309 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 915 (1963); Swanson v. Traer, 249
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encourage courts to refrain from such second-guessing. 99
Finally, the directors must determine whether the results of their
investigation are to be publicized. The inquiry may reveal the existence of potential contingent liabilities which, if publicly disclosed,
might well stimulate litigation against the corporation to the detriment
of its existing shareholders. Although this subject has been a source of
vigorous debate,'°° it would appear that the directors should normally
be guided by the practical guidelines set forth in FASB No. 5, which
authorizes specific disclosure of only those uninsured, unasserted contingencies as to which there is already a probability of assertion against
the corporation and a reasonable possibility of successful recovery in a
material amount.' 0 ' The directors will want to receive assurance that
the corporation has made adequate provision in its reserves for any
losses it might suffer. In any event, should the investigation disclose a
practice, the cessation of which may have a material adverse impact on
F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1957); Galef v. Alexander, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,758 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,788
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Klotz v. Consolidated Edison Co., 386 F. Supp. 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 696 (D.
Del. 1966); Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 240 P.2d 421 (1952); James Talcott, Inc.
v. McDowell, 148 So. 2d 36 (Fla. Ct. App. 1962); Auerbach v. Bennett, 64 App. Div. 2d 98,
408 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Hornstein v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 22 Misc. 2d 996, 37
N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct. 1942), affd, 266 App. Div. 659, 41 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1943), af'dper
curiam, 292 N.Y. 468, 55 N.E.2d 740 (1944). See also FLETCHER, supra note 16, § 5822;
Note, Demand on Directorsand Shareholdersas a Prerequisiteto a DerivativeSuit, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 746, 759 (1960). On the other hand, when the refusal to take action may itself be
illegal, a different rule may apply. See Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974). Furthermore, the courts will conduct their own analysis of the reasonableness of the directors'
business judgment. See Cramer v. General Tel. & Electronics Corp., [1978 Transfer Binder]
96,510 (3d Cir. 1978). In a particular case a court might conFED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
clude that failure to take action could not be sustained as an exercise of prudent business
judgment. See Groel v. United Elec. Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 116, 61 A. 1061 (Ch. 1905); Harris v.
Pearsall, 166 Misc. 366, 190 N.Y.S. 61 (Sup. Ct. 1921); McManis, Questionable Corporate
Payments Abroad- An Antitrust Approach, 86 YALE L.J. 215, 253-56 (1976).
99. Query whether as a result of the decision in Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d
Cir.), cert. granted,47 U.S.L.W. 3221 (1978) (No. 77-1724), courts in the future will also look
to the process by which directors are elected as a factor in determining their objectivity. If
such should come to be the case, this should be a substantial factor in encouraging the use of
effective nominating committees to select directors for boards of directors of public
corporations.
100. See, for example, the proposal submitted by a public interest group that would have
the SEC adopt a rule requiring an attorney to disclose the fraud of his client. [1978] SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA), No. 456, at A-11.
101. See Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5 (Accounting for Contingencies), 3 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH) § 4311, 10 (March 1975). See also
American Bar Association Statement of PolicyRegarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information, 31 Bus. LAW. 561 (1975).
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the corporation's present or future business, or indicates that a senior
manager or director was involved in personal wrongdoing, appropriate
public disclosure should be made.
D. Provision for long-range planning
Although the proper role of directors does not include involvement in the daily operation of the enterprise, the board should ensure
that management has adequately planned for the future of the enterprise. Relevant areas include changing demands for and profitability
of the corporation's products or services and requirements for physical
facilities, staffing, and resource availability. The principal tools of the
board in fulfilling this role are forecasts prepared by management for
planning purposes. 102
Having reviewed those broad areas in which directors can reasonably be expected to take some initiative, it is now appropriate to consider the extent to which there should be differentiation among
directors as to the tasks they are called upon to perform, a question
10 3
briefly touched upon above.

Why Differentiate Among Directors?
One of the sharpest items of dispute in the current debate over
corporate governance concerns eligibility requirements for directors.
The classification utilized in the Corporate Director's Guidebook (prepared by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association)
distinguishes between "management," "affiliated non-management,"
and "unaffiliated non-management," but leaves it to the board of each
102. It has been suggested that disclosure be required of the board'scriteria for evaluating management's performance. See Weiss & Schwartz, Using Disclosure to Activate the
BoardofDirectors,41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 63, 105-07 (1977). As a practical matter, the
board normally monitorsmanagement'scriteria for acceptable profitability of products, services or business segments. The important issue is whether such criteria have been formulated and are being applied in formulating the corporate budget and long-term forecast.
Problems of maintaining confidentiality of business plans with respect to many factors considered in the budget, including new product planning and pricing strategies, would appear
to make it questionable whether public discharge of such criteria could be made in useful
form. There is a hazard in setting up a committee on long-range planning and then having
the committee take no action. See, in this connection, a recent law suit filed against the
directors of W.T. Grant & Co. alleging, inter alia,that the long-range planning committee
never met "due to the emergency nature of Grant's then-existing short term problem." Wall
St. J., April 12, 1978, at 10, col. 2.
103. See notes 54-64 & accompanying text supra.
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corporation to make the appropriate determination. 104 The Chairman
of the SEC has indicated that he believes all directors, save the chief
executive officer, should be nonmanagment directors. 05
This process of differentiation among directors produces at least
two troublesome phenomena. First, it necessitates drawing sharp lines
between types of directors in order to be able to fit all directors into the
classifications created. 0 6 Second, it creates a tendency to conclude that
certain directors are, by virtue of their classification, somehow, endowed with characteristics particularly desirable for the purposes of
corporate governance. 0 7 However, neither the infinitely varied types
of individuals who people the boards of our public corporations nor the
dynamics of board conduct give much assurance that such classifications can have more than limited utility at best, since the best guarantee
of good performance in the last analysis must rest with the individual
character traits of each director. 0 8
Differentiation among directors, however, does serve to clarify the
responsibilities directors may fairly be called upon to assume, and it
104. See CorporateDirector'sGuidebook, supra note 4. The Corporate Director's Guidebook classifies non-management directors as "affiliated" and "unaffiliated." The SEC Proposed Governance Rules would have required identification of directors as "management,"
"affiliated non-management" or "independent," and set forth detailed rules for classifying
directors. See Proposed Governance Rules, supra note 2, Schedule 14A, Item 6. Following
substantial critical comment on the proposal, the SEC chose not to require such identification in the final SEC Corporate Governance Rules, and required only disclosure of specified
relationships. See Corporate GovernanceRules, supra note 2, amending 2 FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 24,037, Schedule 14A, Item 6(b).
105. Speech of SEC Chairman Harold Williams delivered in January, 1978, at the Fifth
Annual Securities Regulation Institute's meeting in San Diego, printedin [19781 SEC. REG.
L. REP. (BNA), No. 437, at A-22.
106. Specific note might be made in this connection of the problem of classifying retired
management directors. A retired management director who has vested retirement benefits
may, for many purposes, be more "independent" and objective as to matters not involving
actions or policies for which he was responsible while active in the company than a nonmanagement director who is a supplier of goods or services to the corporation and who may
be dependent upon future good will of present management in some material way for continuation of his business relationship. However, in the usual case it would seem to be better
practice not to count either director as "unaffiliated non-management" in determining the
appropriate composition of an audit, compensation, or nominating committee. The SEC in
its Corporate Governance Rules requires disclosure of the fact that a director has in the last
five years been an officer or employee of the issuer or any of its parents, subsidiaries or other
affiliates. See Corporate Governance Rules, supra note 2, amending 2 FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 24,037, by adding Item 6(b)(1) of Schedule 14A.
107. For example, is an "independent" director any more sensitive to broad public policy issues affecting the corporation than a "management" director?
108. It was for this reason that the CorporateDirector'sGuidebook, supra note 2, left it to
the sound discretion of each board of directors as to how to classify individual directors and
as to how each board should ultimately be composed.
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gives some minimum guarantee of objectivity in discrete decisionmaking situations. A necessary corollary to this latter purpose is that there
be an overall board environment conducive to the exercise of such objectivity. Each of these purposes will be examined in turn.
Defining Director Responsibility
Defining the responsibilities directors can be fairly called upon to
assume requires, at the outset, an inquiry into whether any distinction
should be drawn between those directors who are involved in the actual
management of the enterprise and those who are not.
The tendency has been to separate for purposes of analysis the
management role and the oversight role assigned to directors, particularly the so-called "outside" or nonmanagement directors. The 1974
amendment to Section 35 of the Model Business Corporation Act
sought to draw this distinction by stating that "the business and affairs
of a corporation shall be managed under the direction of' a board of
directors, rather than "by" a board of directors. This amendment emphasizes the limited role that directors qua directors should play in the
actual operation of a large business enterprise.
However, it must be recognized that stating the dichotomy between management and oversight so simply inevitably blurs what is in
fact a much more complex governance process. Effective management
itself involves the ability to obtain the data necessary for informed decision-making, the ability to act objectively in evaluating the data obtained, and the ability to make and effectively implement decisions
based on the data. The larger the business enterprise, the more this
management process devolves upon the skills of submanagers to whom
responsibility has been delegated. For example, the chief executive officer of a large enterprise should not be concerned with the selection,
compensation, promotion, and separation of each person who occupies
a supervisory role in the enterprise, or of each supplier with whom the
enterprise transacts business; but he or she can be expected to establish
criteria that will guide such decisionmaking by responsible
subordinates. 109
109. For example, he will be expected to adopt policies which make clear that hiring,
compensation, promotion and separation of subordinates is to be accomplished in a manner
which does not discriminate as to sex, age, race, religion or natural origin. Similarly, he will
be expected to adopt policies which insure that goods and services are procured insofar as
possible from more than one source to enhance competition from suppliers both as to price
and service, and to minimize the risk of "favoring" one supplier due to covert relationships

between the supplier and the enterprises' purchasing agents. Where there is such a relation-
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As the importance of the particular decision to the enterprise increases, analysis, evaluation and approval will occur at a higher level
on the management ladder. Executives occupying higher levels of responsibility will be selected and compensated in turn by increasingly
higher levels of management. At some point, employment and compensation of managers at a high enough level may be subject to review
by a committee of the board of directors, such as a wage and compensation committee. However, even that committee will not normally
perform the "management" task of evaluating the performance of any
but the most senior executives of the enterprise. Similarly, decisions
relating to the acquisition of property, and development and distribution of new products and services, will normally be made in the context
of development and implementation of capital budgets, prepared with
input from operating divisions, and ultimately executed by those divisions. Overall capital budgets may often be presented to the board of
directors or a finance committee of the board for review, but unless the
budget is of a size to require the raising of additional capital or the
borrowing of additional funds, the board may not be asked to take specific action thereon.
The foregoing analysis is intended to emphasize that even the
process of "management" does not produce a clear division between
the "managers" and the "managed," since in the very process of decision-making senior managers must rely on their subordinates. In fixing
responsibility for corporate behavior, such reliance should be permitted
within reasonable limits, so long as senior management has developed
basic criteria to guide decisionmaking at lower levels, and sufficiently
supervise decisionmaking to insure objectivity and compliance with the
law. Nonetheless, even if senior managers can demonstrate this quantum of care, courts are likely to hold them to a higher duty of inquiry
and knowledge of corporate conduct than will be required of nonmanagement directors" because of the responsibility for the day-to-day
operations of the enterprise. Although this appraisal may be accurate,
ship, its existence should be disclosed through periodic submission of conflict of interest
statements required of all employees in a position to make decisions for the enterprise.
110. The developing case law seems to support this view. See cases cited note 58 supra.
See also ALl FED. SEC. CODE § 1704(g) (Proposed Official Draft, 1978). Section 35 of the
Model Business Corporation Act did not address the right of an officer to rely on reports of
subordinates but concluded that it was not appropriate in connection with the provisions of
§ 35 to deal with officers who were not also directors of the corporation, noting that although
a non-director officer may have a duty of care similar to that of a director as set forth in § 35,
his ability to rely on information, reports or statements, may, depending upon the circumstances of the particular case, be more limited than in the case of a director in view of the
greater obligation he may have to be familiar with the affairs of the corporation. See Coin-
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it would be well to recognize that, in reality, it may be as unfair to

impute knowledge of particular corporate behavior to any given management director as it would be to impute such knowledge to the nonmanagement directors, especially considering the often extensive scope
of operations of the enterprise involved. It may well be that as directors' responsibilities come to be defined more in terms of ensuring that
appropriate programs have been instituted to deal with the greater
number of problems brought to the attention of the board, the distinc-

tion between management and nonmanagement directors will tend to
blur, and the focus will shift to what is fair to impute to the individual
director, given his particular responsibilities in and knowledge of the
enterprise. " '
In assessing responsibilities of directors, some differentiation may
also be made between directors who serve on particular committees
and those who do not serve. Sections 35 and 42 of the Model Business
Corporation Act, as amended in 1974, seek to draw such a distinction
by permitting noncommittee directors to rely on committee reports so
long as they have exercised reasonable care in delegating responsibility,
and have otherwise complied with the standard of care provided in
Section 35.112
ment on Amendments to Section 35, reprintedin CorporateDirector'sGuidebook, supra note
4, Appendix A.
I11. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1704(g) (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) may implicitly recognize this fact by not drawing any clear distinction between management and non-management directors but simply stating generally that relevant circumstances in determining what
constitutes reasonable investigation or care and reasonable ground for belief include not
only the office held when the defendant is an officer and the presence or absence of another
relationship to the registrant when the defendant is a director or proposed director, but also
the type of the registrant, the type of defendant, and reasonable reliance on officers and
employees and others whose duties should have given them knowledge of the particular
facts (in the light of the functions and responsibilites of the particular defendant with respect
to the registrant and filing), and whether with respect to a fact or document incorporated by
reference, the particular defendant had any responsibility for the fact or document at the
time of the filing from which it was incorporated. The SEC recently had occasion to consider the question of responsibility for documents incorporated by reference in connection
with the liability of underwriters with respect to short-form registration statements on Form
S-16. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5998,[1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 81,761.
112. The comment to the amendment to § 42 of the Model Business Corporation Act,
reprintedin CorporateDirector'sGuidebook, supra note 4, Appendix B, indicates that a noncommittee member's liability would depend upon whether he failed to comply with § 35 and
that "[flactors to be considered in determining whether or not the requirements of Section 35
had been met would include the care used in the delegation to and surveillance over the
committee, and the amount of knowledge regarding the particular matter which the noncommittee director has available to him. Care in delegation and surveillance would include
appraisal of the capabilities and diligence of the committee directors in light of the subject
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Although such a right of reliance may well mean that those directors who are members of committees may assume a greater burden in
particular instances, this does not mean that noncommittee directors
can abdicate responsibility for committee actions. Noncommittee
members are obligated to at least procure and read committee minutes
with a view toward confirming that the committees are carrying out
their prescribed responsibilities.
Assuring Objective Decision-making
The board of directors upon occasion may be called upon to review and make decisions on matters in which one or more directors will
have a personal interest. Some of these situations will recur in the normal course of business, such as the ongoing process of evaluation and
compensation of senior managment; other situations, such as allegations of questionable practices, usually will arise only infrequently and
can be dealt with on an ad hoc basis. Whenever such situations are
presented, it is important to both the corporation and the individual
concerned that the decisionmaking process be as objective as possible.
Action taken by directors not interested in the subject under discussion
not only lends credibility to the concept of accountability to the shareholders, but also gives protection to the individuals involved against
3
shareholders seeking to question the directors' actions." 1
It would, of course, be possible to approach each case of selfinterest on an adhoc basis and attempt to select disinterested directors
to review the case at that time. However, there are sound reasons for
identifying in advance those directors who will participate in the review
process.
First, those recurring situations most appropriately handled by
working committees of the board of directors, such as the compensation and audit committees, require advance appointment of a signifiand its relative importance and would be facilitated, in the usual case, by review of minutes
and recipt of other reports concerning committee activities. By enumerating the foregoing
factors, the Committee intends to emphasize that directors may not abdicate their responsibilities and secure exoneration from liability simply by delegating authority to board committees. A director against whom liability is asserted based upon acts of a committee will be
entitled to assert the defense of compliance with the standards contained in Section 35." See
CorporateDirector's Guidebook, supra note 4, at 47-48. See also Aurell, The CorporateExecutive Committee:. A Dilemma For the Nonmember Director, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 525 (1965).
Corporate statutes may limit the extent to which specific responsibilities may be delegated.
113. See Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); cases cited note 99
supra. See also SEC Rule 16b-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (1977). As noted above, action by
directors not interested in the transaction will shift the burden of proof of a transaction to
the person attacking the transaction. See cases cited note 18 supra.
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cant number of directors to staff committees if they are to function
effectively. Second, some orderly procedure should be arranged for
committee assignments, rotation on committees, selection of new directors, and retirement of directors. In order to enhance the credibility of
this procedure, it should be carried out by a disinterested nominating
committee of directors.1 4 What, in effect, is required is a procedure for
institutionalized objectivity. As increased attention is focused on the
manner in which corporate boards operate, such institutionalized procedures may soon be viewed as important criteria in determining
whether actions taken by a board merit the deference to be accorded to
objective decisionmaking."l 5
If such institutionalized objectivity is to be accomplished, some
differentiation among directors is required, and the differentiation is
most appropriately made between those directors who are most likely
to be involved in activities requiring disinterested review and those directors who are not. Evaluation and compensation of senior managers
and review of the enterprise's financial performance are to be expected
on an on-going basis, and, therefore, the differentiation is normally to
be made between so-called management and nonmanagement directors. However, in making this differentiation, it is important not to lose
sight of the fact that such differentiation is being undertaken solely for
the purpose of institutionalizing objective decisionmaking in situations
where self-interested transactions are expected to recur. Such differentiation carries with it no valid judgment that nonmanagement directors
have any innate traits of character or other qualities that make them
better able than "management" directors to monitor the operation of
the business enterprise or more responsive to the shareholders or any
other constituency served by the corporation. Similarly, differentiation
between "affiliated" and "unaffiliated" or "independent" directors
should be drawn only to enhance the credibility of the decision-making
process in self-interested transactions, by eliminating the danger of
"back-scratching", and not for the purpose of encouraging the drawing
16
of any other inferences.'
114.

This is the recommendation of both the Corporate Director'sGuidebook, supranote

4, and the BusinessRoundtableStatement, supra note 6. This approach is not a wholly novel
one. See M. EISENBERO, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 176-77 (1976).

115. As noted above, action by disinterested directors may shift the burden of proving
unfairness or foreclose the initiation of a derivative shareholder action. See cases cited notes
19, 98 supra;,Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,47 U.S.L.W. 3221 (1978)
(No. 77-1724).
116. The danger of injecting such judgments into definitions of "independence" is high-

lighted by the SEC's Proposed Corporate Governance Rules in which a "control person" of
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It is important that decisions affecting the corporation be made as
objectively as possible, while maintaining the traits of judgment, character, and experience necessary to conduct the affairs of the enterprise."1 7 It is perhaps inevitable that any undertaking to define what
makes a director "unaffiliated" will be negative, in that it will essentially call for demonstrating the absence of relationships likely to affect
the director's objectivity. However, defining "unaffiliated" in this manner carries with it certain risks.
First, such a definition may obscure the reason for identifying the
"unaffiliated" director (to enhance objectivity in self-interested transactions) and lead to unwarranted expectations as to the performance to
be expected of those who fulfill that role on the board. Second, it will
inevitably produce disputes as to which relationships constitute "affiliations" that disqualify an individual from being characterized as an independent director." 8 Third, to the extent that the Government seeks
to involve itself in the resolution of these disputes, even indirectly by
the issuer was automatically deemed to be an "affiliated non-management director." See
81,645, at 80,578, Instruction (8). By what
Proposed Governance Rules, supra note 2,
process of alchemy is a substantial shareholder who has no other relationship with the corporation in a management capacity transmuted into an affiliated director? Presumably, such
a shareholder would have the greatest stake in the proper governance of the corporation and
should be fully qualified to sit on committees of non-management directors such as the
compensation, audit or nominating committees. Only in the case of participation in a discrete transaction with the corporation involving such an individual's self-interest should the
transaction be reviewed by other directors not interested in the transaction. Cf. Puma v.
Mariott Corp., 283 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 1971). As finally adopted, the SEC Corporate Governance Rules continue to require disclosure of the fact that a director is a control person of
the issuer (other than solely as a director of the issuer). See note 37 supra.
117. For a description of the qualities of character believed important in the individual
director, see CorporateDirector's Guidebook, supra note 4.
118. The question as to whether a control person who is not involved in management of
the enterprise should be deemed "affiliated" is an apt example. See note 116 supra. Particular industries may also require practical judgments in applying tests of affiliation. For example, in the banking industry traditionally banks have sought to place on their boards as
directors substantial businessmen in the community who would place in the bank the deposits of their businesses for the bank's benefit. So long as such a director's transactions with
the bank are subject to careful scrutiny by bank examiners and so long as such lending
transactions are carried out at a prime rate fixed by competition in the marketplace and
justified because of the size of the particular entity and reviewed by other directors, there
does not seem to be much risk involved in permitting such directors to continue to serve on
bank boards. Indeed, such directors, because of the deposits which their companies maintain
with the bank, have a particular interest in seeing that the bank is safely and prudently
managed. Those hard cases, where banks made loans in excess of legal limits to insiders,
should not require a change in the entire corporate governance structure, and recent extensive legislative changes dealing with supervisory authority over financial institutions do not
attempt to make such changes. See, Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate
Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, §§ 101-113, 201-209, 92 Stat. 3641.
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disclosure requirements, it may burden the task of director selection
with bureaucratic procedures that place undue emphasis on the absence of affiliation and make the process of recruiting directors more
cumbersome. 19
The foregoing risks are not intended to suggest that disclosure of
director affliations would be inappropriate, but rather to emphasize
that care must be taken in the manner in which disclosure is made. It
should be sufficient to require a corporation to disclose in its proxy
material the relationships that each director has that might affect his or
her objectivity, and in general to eschew the process of attempting to

pigeon-hole directors by applying labels of management, nonmanagement, affiliated, and independent to each director. 20 In the final analysis, the board of each corporation must recommend to its shareholders
the proper mix of individuals on its board. If the board's selections and
committee structure fail to create an environment conducive to objective decisionmaking, the board will inevitably be penalized when particular transactions are tested in the courts, as judges can be expected to
scrutinize with increasing frequency the realities of board environment
2
when dealing with interested transactions.1 '
119. The experience with administration of the Investment Company Act of 1940 is instructive in this connection. As to whether an individual proposed as a director of a registered investment company constitutes "an interested person" under § 2(a)(19) of that Act,
see [1978] SEc. REG. L. REP. (BNA), No. 460, at C-2. The SEC Proposed Corporate Governance Rules stated broadly that notwithstanding the definition of "independent director,"
if the issuer were aware of other relationships between a nominee or the issuer or its affiliates
which, under the circumstances, could reasonably be viewed as interfering with such nominee's exercise of independent judgment, reference to such nominee as a "independent director" would be inappropriate. See Proposed Governance Rules, supra note 2, 81,645, at
80,578-79. If the proposed regulations had been adopted, corporations might have felt
obliged in case of doubt to seek rulings from the SEC staff on the accuracy of their disclosures as to whether directors were "independent" or "affiliated" or run the risk of Enforcement Division proceedings. Since the SEC Corporate Governance Rules as finally adopted
avoid any requirement that directors be specifically identified as "management," "affiliated
non-management" or "independent," there should be less pressure on reporting companies
to fit all directors in one of three categories. However, disclosure is still required of all
relationships between the director and the issuer or its management substantially similar in
nature and scope to those specifically required to be disclosed. See Corporate Governance
Rules, supra note 2, amending 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 24,037, by adding Item 6(b)(7)
of Schedule 14A.
120. The SEC Corporate Governance Rules make clear that labels may only be utilized
to connote a lack of relationship to the issuer and its management where there is an absence
of significant business or personal relationships between the director and the issuer or its
management. See CorporateGovernanceRules, supra note 2, amending 2 FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 124,037, by adding Item 6(b)(7) of Schedule 14A.
121. See Berkman v. Rust Craft Greeting Cards, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 96,515 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), where the court emphasized the materiality to
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To What Extent Should Directors Be Made Subject To
Shareholder Direction In Carrying Out Their
Responsibilities?
The legal theories through which the governance mechanism of
the modern American business corporation has evolved reflect a curious paradox. Although some courts have suggested that shareholders
do have the right to assert themselves in connection with how their
corporations are governed, 22 modern corporation statutes, with limited
exceptions, 2 3 do not vest in shareholders the power to initiate or direct
corporate action. The board of directors generally has been vested with
the responsibility for managing, or more recently, overseeing the man24
agement of the corporation as fiduciaries for the shareholders.
While the directors share this power to some extent with their shareholder "beneficiaries" through the joint exercise of certain fundamental
powers, such as the amendment of the charter and the approval of certain types of corporate combinations, 2 5 the shareholders' prime statushareholders of a director's "track" record, in concluding that a third-party adverse conflict
of interest known to directors should have been disclosed to shareholders as reflecting on the
director's integrity and fitness. See also Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3221 (1978) (No. 77-1724); Cramer v. General Tel. & Electronics
Corp., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,510 (3d Cir. 1978); Gall v.
Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The reliance by directors on the advice of
counsel may also increasingly be emphasized by the courts in examining the objectivity of
the board's decisionmaking process. See Wright v. Heiser, 560 F.2d 236, 248, 252 (7th Cir.
1977); Hawes & Sherrard, supra note 77, at 24-25. It may therefore become important for
corporations to follow the example of General Motors and provide that the power of appointment (and removal) of the General Counsel rests with the Board of Directors. See
General Motors Corporation By-Laws, Art. 59.
122. See SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
847 (1948); Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 680-681 (D.C. Cir.
1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1973). See also Natural Resources Defense Council v.
SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190, 1205, 1211-12 (D.D.C. 1977).
123. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1900 (West 1977) (provisions permitting shareholders to
initiate dissolution of the corporation). The state statutes authorizing shareholders to initiate dissolution proceedings are analyzed in 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANNOTATED 484-88 (2d ed. 1971). The SEC stockholder proposal rules set forth in Rule 14a-8,
even as liberalized by eliminating any requirement of economic significance to a corporation's business, see SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 12999 (Nov. 22, 1976), 10 SEC
DOCKET 1006 (1976), do not contemplate initiation of direct corporate action by shareholders, nor require director response to a proposal.
124. See ALI-ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 35 (1974); FLETCHER, supra note 16,

§ 838.
125. Even these provisions for sharing of power may be diluted by grants of authority to
directors who determine the rights, preferences, privileges and limitations applicable to preferred stock through certificates of determination of preferences and may in the case of corporate business combinations be avoided entirely by the manner in which the transaction is
structured. Some limitations on this avoidance may be imposed by stock exchange require-
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tory remedy for expressing dissatisfaction with director action is the
theoretical power of removal. 126 In the case of the large, publicly held
corporation this power is capable of use only by someone with the
financial resources to mount a proxy fight or tender offer. Accordingly,
the question must be asked whether this statutory framework should be
modified in some fashion so as to provide shareholders with a more
effective means of lending guidance to the board of directors.
It is not surprising that there would be some sympathy for the concept of "shareholder democracy" in a country such as ours where governmental institutions are made subject to such direction through the
process of the initiative. 127 The recent phenomenon of tax legislation
through the initiative process in California might be thought to encourage such sentiments with respect to other large institutions, govern28
mental or private, which have a substantial impact on our citizenry.
There are, however, differences between the phenomenon of direct
citizen action through the initiative process and the prospect of direct
shareholder action to control corporate decisionmaking that mandate
caution before carrying the analogy too far.
First, it is not clear that the shareholders of American business
corporations share the same enthusiasm for the initiative process as the
citizenry at-large as applied to the corporate sector. A substantial portion of the voting shares of publicly held corporations are held by insti129
tutions acting for the benefit of others, often in a fiduciary capacity.
Such institutions typically have not sought in the past to take an active
role in supervising management. Unless and until there is a clear manifestation that a substantial portion of the shareholding public believes
ments. See NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL A-283-4; AMERICAN STOCK

EXCHANGE COMPANY GUIDE § 713. The State of California, in its newly revised Corporations Code has attempted to unify and rationalize the circumstances in which shareholder
approval should be required in cases of corporate combinations. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 181,
1201 (West 1977).
126. The various state statutes authorizing removal of directors are analyzed in 1
MODEL BusINEss CORPORATION ACT ANNOTATED 812 (2d ed. 1971).

127. A Library of Congress survey indicates that 23 states presently have initiative procedures and that during the past 80 years a total of 1200 proposals have been submitted
through this process. See San Francisco Chronicle, May 15, 1978, at 10, col. 1.
128. However, it is significant that none of the suggestions for governance submitted in
the recent SEC hearings apparently contemplated any such direct stockholder action. See
SEC Staff Summary, supra note 2.
129. Eleven major groupings of institutional investors combined held $341.5 billion or
34.3% of total stock outstanding in the United States at the end of 1977, according to preliminary estimates released by the SEC. See SEC News Digest No. 78-118, June 19, 1978.
Such institutions would include shares held by pension funds, mutual funds, and bank trust
departments.
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such right of access is worth the cost, it would seem a dubious policy to
commit any substantial portion of the efforts of regulatory agencies to
achieving such a result.130 Second, many of the contemporary concerns
with corporate conduct that might render direct access to corporate
government superficially appealing relate to issues ill suited for resolution through that process,' 3 ' either because they involve public policy
130. Some suggestions were made in the recent SEC corporate governance hearings that
at least some changes in corporate oversight procedures be instituted only with the approval
of the shareholders of each corporation involved and not by rules of universal applicatiod.
See SEC Staff Summary, supra note 2, 81,653, at 80,660. It might be argued that if beneficial holders of shares held by institutions were given pass-through voting rights, a more
direct access by the public could result. Even without considering the practical problems
caused by any such generally attempted pass-through, the SEC's own past experience has
been that the public at large is not all that interested in particular public interest issues. See
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5627 (1975), [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED.
.SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,310, at 85,719-21 (Proposed Environmental Disclosures), where the
commission stated: "The Commission's experience over the years in proposing and framing
disclosure requirements has not led it to question the basic decision of the Congress that,
insofar as investing is concerned, the primary interest of investors is economic. After all, the
principal, if not the only reason why people invest their money in securities is to obtain a
return. A variety of other motives are probably present in the investment decisions of numerous investors but the only common thread is the hope for a satisfactory return, and it is
to this that a disclosure scheme intended to be useful to all must be primarily addressed."
See also SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5704 (1976), [1975-1976 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 80,495 (Rulemaking on Environmental Disclosure),
describing the proceedings engendered by litigation instituted by the National Resources
Defense Council, as a result of which the Commission compiled an estimated 15,000 pages
of comments, testimony, memoranda, and data over a five-year period. The Commission
noted that the approximately 100 participants in the proceedings who identified themselves
as investors who consider such information important constituted an insignificant percentage of the estimated 30,000,000 United States shareholders and those who identified their
interest holdings constituted approximately two-thirds of one percent of the estimated aggregate value of the common and preferred stock and corporate bonds held in the United States
at the end of 1974. The Commission also noted that while the proceedings were given considerable publicity, no one was required to respond and the number who did so was relatively small, considering the fact that investors number in the millions. See Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 5627, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
80,310, at 85,719-20. This same result has apparently been experienced by the private sector.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. has indicated that of the 465,000 communications
from shareholders which it received in 1977, only one-fifth of one percent related to corporate governance, and the vast majority dealt with matters of economic interest. Others have
indicated a similar lack of interest by shareholders in socially significant information. See
SEC Staff Summary, supra note 2, 81,653, at 80,637-38, 80,640, 80,648. Furthermore, extensive changes in shareholder voting procedures may not be necessary in any event to permit a determined group of shareholders to make their point, so long as the SEC staff is
flexible in permitting shareholder resolutions to be placed in proxy statements. See N.Y.
Times, April 9, 1978, § 3, at 1,col. 3; N.Y. Times, April 9, 1978, § 3, at 8, col. 4.
131. The courts have attempted to distinguish between suits by stockholders seeking to
vindicate public interest issues from suits by stockholders who were concerned for the welfare of their corporation. See, e.g., Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 291 Minn. 322, 191 N.W.2d
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issues more appropriately resolved through governmental institutions 13 or because they involve individual instances of misconduct that
must in any event be handled on a case-by-case basis.133
The conclusion that there are practical limitations on increased
shareholder participation in the corporate governance process does not,
of course, mean that directors are entitled to ignore the views of their
shareholders. Indeed, it is important that directors not allow their own
individual predilections to obscure the broader objectives of the corporation. 34 This perspective will become particularly important as the
extent to which corporations should participate in the political process
in light of the recent Bellotti decision is considered.' 3 5 It would be unfortunate to see corporate boards unduly hamstrung in commenting on
issues of public importance that are relevant to the corporation's business operations. However, it would be equally unfortunate if the business community were to accept the Bellotti decision as a broad
mandate to take stands on all public issues, whether or not relevant to
the success of the particular business enterprise. To do so might lend
credence to the contention that, at least in the area of public comment,
the voice of the shareholders should be heard before the corporation
36
itself speaks.
406 (1971). See also Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir.
1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1973).
132. Consider, for example, the problems, including foreign relations problems, relating
to investment in South Africa.
133. See notes 69-101 & accompanying text supra. In addition to the problems noted in
the text, any initiative process has the additional problem of effectiveness in dealing with
complex issues on which the shareholder has limited information and as to which the corporation may be under some constraints as to public disclosure.
134. See Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 680-681 (D.C. Cir.
1970), where the court noted that directors of the corporation who were defending the
manufacture and sale of napalm admitted that the corporation was making no profit on the
sales whereas the complaining shareholders who were attacking sales of the product not
required by government order were claiming that the corporation was being hurt by continuation of such sales due to the image it was creating in the minds of young people whose
employment was vital to the long term wellbeing of the corporation.
135. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 432 U.S. 904 (1978). The corporate power to make
contributions for political purposes has been recognized as a matter of state law. See Marsili
v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 51 Cal. App. 3d 313, 124 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1975).
136. Consideration might be given to having a board committee-such as a social or
public responsibility committee-review corporate advertising and contributions involving
matters of general public interest before action is taken by the corporation on such matters.
See, on a related subject, the recommendation of the FIFTY-FOURTH AMERICAN ASSEMBLY
ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AMERICA 8 (1978) that procedures be established by cor-

porations for hearing the concerns of groups affected by corporate actions, and that a public
issues committee of the board should assure that these procedures are utilized by management to weigh the consequences of corporate action.
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There are steps that a board may take to be responsive to its shareholders in the area of corporate governance. It can, through the
board's nominating committee, receive shareholder suggestions regarding potential nominees for the board of directors. It can also take the
initiative in responding to shareholder concerns about particular corporate actions by seeking to explain to the shareholders its position on
controversial issues, rather than avoiding discussion of these issues by
opposing inclusion of shareholder proposals in proxy statements as not
relevant to the corporation's business. 137 Acknowledging the expense
of such a policy, there is, nonetheless, a certain therapeutic process involved in requiring the senior management and board to articulate
clearly the reasons for their corporation's position on issues of public
concern. 13 8 Furthermore, management may find it more productive in
the long-run to concentrate on responding at shareholders' meetings to
certain issues known to be of interest to shareholders, rather139than attempting to divine in advance what questions will be asked.
Conclusion
As the current interest in corporate governance continues to spark
debate, this article has attempted to present a useful frame of reference
for considering issues related to the structure, composition, and responsibilities of boards of directors. What is now required is an effort to
broaden the base of corporate boards by identifying individuals with
the experience, temperament, and commitment necessary to make them
effective contributors to the process of corporate governance as non137. Consideration must, of course, be given to whether the particular question represents simply an isolated attempt by one shareholder or a limited number of shareholders to
gain attention or represents a fairly pervasive concern of a number of shareholders.
138. The Prime Minister's Question Hour in the English House of Commons offers a
useful analogy. However, it may have its limitations when applied in a corporate context
and may raise problems of confidentiality, such as in questions concerning pending litigation
to which the corporation will not be able to respond. Some of those responding in the SEC's
recent corporate governance hearings offered a variety of suggestions, such as the Levi
Strauss proposal that shareholder proposals be permitted to require management to discuss
certain areas of general interest to shareholders and the AT&T proposal requiring summaries of shareholder communications and company responses in the company's annual report,
subject to certain management discretion. See SEC Staff Summary, supra note 2, 81,653,
at 80,640. Some corporations are moving toward several "informal" shareholders' meeting
on a regional basis, where more shareholders will have an opportunity to engage in a dialogue with management. See N.Y. Times, April 9, 1978, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
139. Such an approach might require limitation on the ability of shareholders to introduce proposals at the annual meeting. Such a limitation might take the form of a by-law
amendment restricting shareholder proposals at the meeting to those which had appeared in
the proxy statement.
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management directors. Potential candidates need not be limited to the
most senior executives of corporations. 140 As indicated above, it is
more important that the individuals selected have the appropriate traits
of character, maturity, and experience, as well as a commitment to
make the process work in the long-term interests of the private enterprise system.

140. Perhaps attempts should be made to develop a publicly available list as to potential
available directors based on proxy statement filings with the SEC identifying the remuneration paid to senior officers of companies making filings under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Note that under recent SEC revisions in proxy statement regulations, the identity of
such senior management officers for which disclosure must be made has been expanded in
number. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15380, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,765, and 4 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 70,962, Regulation S-K,
Item 4 (a) (1978). Such a list need not be confined to business executives, but might include
others (such as educators active in the business administration field, retired partners in accounting and law firms, and retired business executives) whose past experience might make
them logical nominees as directors. This is not to suggest that recent efforts by the business
community to broaden the background of board members should be abandoned. What is
suggested is a conscious effort to identify in some organized fashion potential candidates for
board membership. See, in this connection, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1979, § F, at 3, col. 1.

